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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TAX
BASE AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING:
EVIDENCE FROM STATE PANEL DATA, 1977-1992
Essentially, there are two competing propositions on tax base choices. The
optimal tax theory on taxation asserts that the broader the tax base the better the
tax. On the other hand, some public choice proponents have argued that, at the
constitutional level, we should choose to restrict the power to tax and thus limit the
available base. These theories assert fundamentally different views on the state and
its citizens.
Within the traditional optimal tax framework, governments maximize
resident’s utility and tax base broadening lowers the tax rate, thus there is a
revenue neutral response. When, however, governments do not choose to
maximize resident’s utility, then increases in the tax base can have an impact on
government’s revenues and spending.
In order to determine if tax bases influence government spending data on
forty-eight states were compiled for the years 1977 through 1992. A state finance

system of equations was developed. Using three-stage least squares
estimation in a fixed effects econometric model, the relationship between the
broadness of a tax base and state government spending was estimated. The state
sales tax base was the tax base used to study this relationship. The results of this
estimation found that states with broader sales tax bases had higher spending, all
else equal. This result suggest that governments do not act as if they maximize
resident utility when making tax base and rate decisions, otherwise base broadness
would have no impact on spending. An additional result from this empirical
analysis, is that tax base and rates are inversely related, but the relationship does
not lead to revenue-neutral adjustments.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Considerable discussion has lately centered on the impact of an eroding sales
tax base and the need to include internet sales into the base. Currently, efforts are
underway to streamline the states’ sales tax systems in an effort to make it easier to
tax e-commerce1. State governors and budget directors have been espousing the
need to discover straightforward ways to tax these interactions2. Some state
governors argue that internet sales are a needed part of a state’s sales tax base in
order to stabilize a shrinking base because the states are facing increasing demand
for government expenditures. Additionally in an attempt to stabilize and increase
revenues (Dye and Mcguire, 1991), states have tried to broaden the tax base by
implementing a sales tax on services. Thus recent suggestions for expanding the
sales tax base have included not only internet sales, but also services and mail
order sales.
Firms and customers, on the other hand, are concerned with the potential
impact of taxing internet sales and some described this base broaden efforts as a
“revenue grab by government” (Wall Street Journal, November, 1996). Florida’s
implementation of taxation on services, for example, was met with strong
opposition by both consumers and businesses as the difficulties in applying the tax
consistently to services became apparent (Fox, 1992). Florida rescinded this broad
base tax on services within the first year of its commencement. Thus, there is an
ongoing debate over broadening the sales tax base with respect to the impact and
motivation for broadening the base.

1

The project is currently being pilot tested in four states. This streamlined approach to sales taxation is currently supported by 27
states. Information regarding this project can be viewed at www.streamlinedsalestax.org
2
On May 17, 2001 the Washington Times reported only four governors support U.S. congressional legislation to continue a
moratorium on internet taxation.
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The Changing Sales Tax Base
Using state data from 1977 to 1992, the graph at the end of this section
shows how the size of the sales tax base has steadily decreased. During this time,
nearly 32 percent of all state tax revenues came from the sales tax. In 1977, 30.5
percent of all tax revenue was generated by the general sales tax. By 1992, this had
increased to 32.8 percent, peaking at 33.2 percent in 1991. Clearly the ability for
states to tax e-commerce or find ways to tax services is a legitimate concern of
state policy makers given the erosion of the tax base over time and the states’
reliance on the sales tax. Also during this period, states responded to the shrinking
tax base by increasing the sales tax rate. The graph below shows how the mean
sales tax rate has increased by approximately one percentage point, from 3.6
percent to nearly 4.7 percent, an increase of 30.5 percent.
Since states rely on the sales tax as a major source of revenue, the ability to
understand the relationships between the tax base, tax rate and the resulting
expenditures fed by these revenues is important. Currently the trend is toward
narrower bases and higher rates, if the efforts to broaden the sales tax base are
realized what might that portend for the sales tax rate and government spending?

2

Figure 1.1 State Mean Tax Base and Tax Rate
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The Political Economy of Tax Rates and Bases
This study assists our understanding of the relationships between tax base
broadness, tax rates, and expenditures. This understanding will allow one to
answer the question, does a more comprehensive sales tax base lead to revenue
neutral adjustments in tax rates? Knowing what influence base broadening has on
government spending will represent an important contribution to the ongoing fiscal
policy debate concerning the taxation of e-commerce and services.
The focus of this study, therefore, will be on the state sales tax and the
influence tax base choices have on state government expenditures. The study will
be an empirical examination of the relationship between tax rates, bases, and
expenditures. It will provide insight into the appropriate setting for government
revenue objectives. The empirical test will be conducted using the percentage of
the available sales tax base taxed by a state and determining what, if any, impact
that choice of tax base has on expenditures, holding constant other determinants of
state spending.
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This study offers contributions to our understanding of state sales tax
systems and indirectly government behavior. It will contribute in two distinct
ways. First, it will contribute towards building a positive model of government
behavior by examining the impact tax base choices have on government spending.
Secondly, it provides an understanding about the behavior of governments.
Specifically, this study will determine whether broadening the sales tax base
positively impacts a state’s per capita expenditures.
Since this essay will address the political economy of tax base choices as
they are related to expenditure outcomes, it will not only add to our understanding
of this relationship, but it will also help inform the broader question: What is the
appropriate setting within which to study government activity? One political
economy approach to the appropriate setting for government behavior would
suggest that if government’s behavior is to maximize voters welfare and the voter
acts as a constraint on government excesses, then the need to constrain the tax rates
and bases made available to government would needlessly lead to a inefficient tax
system. Historically, however, this model of constrained government behavior is
called into question. For example, the tax limitation movements suggest that the
constraint of the voter may not always be sufficient to constrain government. In
fact, another political economy approach to the appropriate setting for government
activity would suggest that an inefficient tax system is desirable so as to more fully
constrain government revenue raising power. It is the purpose of this empirical
research to contribute to the debate on the appropriate setting with which to study
government.

4

Two Views of Government and the “Optimal Tax Base”
Taxpayers have, from time to time, voted to impose restrictions on a state’s
taxing power. Proposition 13 in California, over twenty years ago, was one of the
most notable cases of voters choosing to impose such restrictions. Recently, such
voter impositions have occurred in Virginia and Washington regarding the
application of an automobile excise tax. This led to the election of a new governor
promising to overturn the tax, and a referendum to abolish the tax, respectively. In
Colorado since 1992, tax and fee increases must pass voter approval before they
can be enacted. Larry Kallenberger, the executive director of Colorado Counties
Inc., who originally opposed the initiative concludes that tax increases have not
been difficult to pass if the purpose is clear. He says elected officials can't "keep
acting like citizens are our enemies and we have to fight with them all the time."
The interpretations of these actions taken by voters in the state depend in
part on your view of the roles played by the government and its citizens. The
public choice literature offers different concepts on the state (Mueller, 1996) and
different views on the size of government which are derived from these concepts.
Depending on which view is accepted, the actions by a government and the use of
its taxing power will have different interpretations. One conceptualization of the
state is drawn from the classical theory of the democratic state, where ultimate
authority rests with the voter/taxpayer. One such classical public choice theory is
the frequently espoused median voter theorem where the outcome of majority
voting reflects the preferences of the median voter.
Under this view, the change in voter preferences, for example, would be a
viable explanation for tax limitation referendums. Similarly, complaints lodged
against the use of certain tax bases may stem from voter/taxpayers that do not,
5

within the distribution of all voter/taxpayers, represents the views held by the
median voter/taxpayer.
Another conceptualization of the state places the state and its government
above the citizens. It is the preferences of the state, or the individuals in the
government, that are deterministic. This view is characterized in the work by
Niskanen (1971, 1975) and Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980).
Under this view of the state, for example, the tax limitation movements and
voices raised against the use of certain tax bases may represent a true divergence in
preferences between the taxing authority and the voter/taxpayer. Both of these
views, may to some degree be correct. Government officials and bureaucrats can
seek to advance their own preferences similar to the revenue maximizing or
bureaucratic model, while the voter/taxpayer through its voting power represents
some constraint similar to the median voter model.
In the study of governments, the standard approach often is to treat
voters/taxpayers as rational, self interested individuals and government decision
makers as seeking only to promote the general welfare. This according to
Buchanan (1972) does not represent a closed behavioral loop. Closing the
behavioral loop requires that the same rational, self interested decision calculus
that motivates the voter/taxpayer apply to decision making in the public sector.
Within this context, the degree to which the state exists to “carry out the will
of the people” and the degree to which government official and bureaucrats have
discretionary power could matter with respect to tax base choices and the
constraint imposed through tax base limitations. It is the purpose of this essay to
help inform this debate and to provide some understanding of how governments
respond to the availability of broad based taxes.
Referendums, constitutional amendments, and election of representatives
promising to repeal taxes provide evidence there exist a perception among at least
6

some voter/taxpayers that political constraints are not always sufficient in
constraining the powers of government. There appears to be a divergence of
motives for the taxing authority and the voter/taxpayer. This perceived divergence
can help explain some of the tax limitation movements occurring over the last
twenty plus years. James Madison in The Federalist Papers writes, “In forming a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies
in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the
next place oblige it to control itself.”
One result of the efforts to obligate government to control itself is the
enactment by twenty-four states of constitutional or statutory state tax and/or
expenditure limits (TELs). The passage of these limits can reflect changes in voter
preferences about the size of government, the tax structure, or both. The success at
the ballot box of referendums limiting government taxing activities suggest
political constraints can be perceived by the voter/taxpayer as only partially
effective in delivering the desired level of government and/or the appropriate tax
structure to obtain the desired level. Thus, voters turn to these constitutional
constraints as a possible way to control the taxing powers granted to government.
Cutler, et al (1999) found that people supported tax limitations for two
primary reasons: because their government was perceived to raise revenue for
projects not valued by the people; because they believed government goods were
produced inefficiently. Again, these perceptions imply that political constraints
have been ineffective in constraining government taxing activity and the populace
sought constitutional constraints.
All this on tax limitations points to the fact that recent tax history of states
implies that a purely symbiotic relationship between government and the
voter/taxpayer may not at all times exist. The voter without constitutional
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protection may not think that through her vote alone she is able to constrain
government activity and thus chooses constitutional constraints.
Within the context of tax limitation movements, there often exists an attitude
among constituents of a state that broadening of the tax base is an attempt at
maximizing revenues3. As noted, considerable discussion lately has centered
around the impact of an eroding sales tax base and the desire to include internet
sales into a state’s sales tax base.
The anecdotal evidence presented indicates government is sometimes
perceived by voter/taxpayers as something other than a benevolent equi-revenue
provider of public goods and services. The equi-revenue government, as defined by
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) is one where the government obtains revenues just
equal to the cost required to meet the demand for government goods and services.
The equi-revenue government is analogous to the firm under perfect competition
where the price of the good is equal to the marginal cost to produce the good which
is equal to the quantity demanded in equilibrium. While this study will not
explicitly offer insight into the conceptual relationship between the state and its
citizens, it will provide insight into what represents the appropriate objective
function to assign governments.
Essentially, there are two competing propositions on tax base choices. The
optimal tax theory on taxation asserts that the broader the tax base the better the
tax. On the other hand, some public choice proponents have argued that, at the
constitutional level, we should choose to restrict the power to tax and thus limit the
available base. These theories assert fundamentally different views on the state and
its citizens, as mentioned above.
3

A Wall Street Journal article published Tuesday, May 26, 1998 comments on the recent success of a Virginia political
candidate whose primary initiative was the repeal of the automobile property tax and how other State politicians are seeking to
capitalize on this voter sentiment concerning the automobile property tax and its perception that “much of it is a revenue grab” by
the state governments.
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The purpose of this study, however, is to move the discussion of policy
outcomes away from purely normative assertions and place the focus on a positive
analysis of how public institutions actually function. The positive model would say
that government officials are fully constrained in their ability to gain a surplus
from revenues, they are not constrained, or they are partially constrained.
Regardless of the degree of constraint, the assumption of the analysis is that the
taxpayer/voter and the government official are both acting rationally in their own
self-interest.
It is hoped that this study will contribute to those bodies of literature that
explore the fiscal policy effects on government expenditures and possible
normative implications for policy makers. The contribution is to both the public
finance and public choice literature by integrating the two for an empirical
examination on the relationship between the tax base and government spending.
Thus, the major hypothesis to be tested in this study is “ do broad base taxes lead
to higher expenditures?” Given the current debate on the taxation of internet sales
and broadening of the tax base by adding services to the base, this study will
provide some insight into the potential benefits and costs to be considered by
voters and policymakers.
Outline of Dissertation
The balance of the study will be divided into five chapters, chapter two
consists of a literature review of the two contrasting theories on the appropriate tax
base; the public finance optimal tax literature and the public choice Leviathan
literature. An overview of the optimal tax theory will be provided and juxtaposed
with the constitutional approach to taxation found in the Leviathan model of
government behavior. The final parts of this chapter will explore the literature
which has undertaken a search of Leviathan motives in government behavior and
9

the literature involved in analyzing whether revenue causes expenditures or vice
versa.
The third chapter will be a simple tax model. It will show how this model
can yield the exact same results whether optimal tax policy is prescribed or
revenue maximizing objectives are imposed on the model. This will lead into a
discussion of the comparative static outcomes possible from changes on the
commodity tax base.
The fourth chapter begins with the development of the econometric model
and estimation procedure. The estimation will encompass a system of equations
that model government fiscal activities. The estimation procedure will be one that
accounts for the longitudinal characteristics of the state data, as well as the
simultaneity inherent in a state finance system. The fourth chapter concludes with a
discussion of the data used to estimate the structural equations of interest in the
state finance model. Additional literature supporting the use of variables and
structural equations in the model will be presented. A variable list and description
along with summary statistics of the variables, as constructed for the estimation,
will be included in this section.
The fifth chapter will present the results of the econometric model
estimation. In this section a complete report on the parameter estimates for the
various specifications will be presented. The sign, magnitude, and statistical
significance of the estimated equation’s parameters will be investigated for
consistency with theory and other empirical works.
The final chapter reports on the results of the empirical test performed in
Chapter Five. The results of the research finds that tax base broadening will lead to
higher government spending. Also, the sales tax base and rate are inversely related,
but they do adjust in a revenue neutral manner. The chapters discusses the
appropriate setting for government fiscal activity based on these findings, what this
10

empirical study portends for future research, as well as, what impact it will have on
the development of a positive model for government will be presented.
Contribution
In summary, this study advances both the public finance and public choice
literature by integrating the two strains and empirically examining the relationship
between the tax base and government spending. It addresses the fundamental
question “ do broad base taxes lead to higher expenditures, ceteris paribus?”
The research offers two important contributions: understanding the impact
the tax base size has on government spending, and the relationship between the tax
base and rate; and advancing our understanding of government behavior.
Finally, the relationships that will be developed in this study can be used in
future research examining different levels of government and different taxes
available to government.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Since Tiebout’s (1956) response to Samuelson’s (1954) treatise on public
goods, research has focused on local fiscal policies and public good provision.
Tiebout suggested that the provision of local public goods in a federal system of
numerous jurisdictions is analogous to a competitive market for private goods. The
Tiebout model is filled with many rigid assumptions which lead to efficient
equilibrium. The efficient equilibrium derived from a heterogeneous population
that costlessly divides into jurisdictions that are homogeneous in the demand for
public services is a Pareto equilibrium in this setting. For this global optimality to
exist the following conditions must be met: full mobility of all citizens; full
knowledge of each communities characteristics, fiscal and otherwise; an absence of
scale economies in public good production or an optimum scale of production
achieved at small levels of output; no spillover effects across communities; an
absence of geographical private good price differences or differences with respect
to earnings. The existence of an efficient equilibrium is called into question
however, when any one of these assumptions of the Tiebout model is relaxed.
In local public finance, efficiency or optimality in the provision of
public goods applies to both the intrajurisdicitional efficiency and the
interjurisdictional efficiency (Rubinfeld, 1987). Intrajurisdictional efficiency is
given by the condition that the sum of all individuals within the jurisdiction net-ofcosts willingness to pay for the public good is maximized. The interjurisdictional
efficiency involves a system of jurisdictions where migration is possible.
Efficiency is obtained when the number of existing jurisdictions results in the
sufficient level of provision of the public good at the lowest cost. This notion of
jurisdictional optimality not only is concerned with the efficient provision of the
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public good, but the optimal size of the jurisdiction (or club) is now relevant. The
Tiebout model focuses primarily on the interjurisdictional efficiency and is an
analysis of the efficient provision of public goods in a series of clubs or
jurisdictions. This study will look at state tax systems, but will not specifically
consider the intrajurisdictional efficiencies. It will, however, provide insight into
interjurisdictional efficiencies within a federalist system.
I am interested in determining a positive model of government
behavior by gaining an understanding of the relationship between tax bases, rates
and debt instruments available to governments and government spending. Of
particular interest is the work of Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980, and
1985) on government as a Leviathan. Their work on public finance has generated a
body of literature that explores the theoretical and empirical implications of fiscal
policy in a federalist constitutional system. According to Brennan and Buchanan
(1980) efficiency conditions are typically derived under a simplistic view of
government. They go on to argue that a more complete analysis distinguishes
different behavioral models that may result in non-optimal public expenditures.
One model developed by Niskanen (1971) shows, in a non-federalist system,
how the level of public expenditures may be greater than that desired by the
median voter. This occurs because policy makers have some bureaucratic power.
This argument is a generalization of the Romer and Rosenthal (1978) agenda
setting view of bureaucrats who desire larger governments output, but are not
particularly concerned about higher wages for themselves or their employees.
Broad or Narrow Tax Base: Divergent Views
There are two divergent views of the appropriate tax base that should
be made available to governments. The normative optimal tax prescription is for a
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broad base that leads to a lower tax rate. This theory assumes that for a given level
of revenue that a broad base minimizes the excess burden of the tax system since it
will raise the necessary revenue at lower rates. If however a broader base does not
lead to sufficiently lower rates, then broad base tax structures could contribute to
higher government expenditures. Brennan and Buchanan (1978) argue that a
reasonable tax system that accounts for a governments power to tax may look
much different than the tax system which ignores the political setting which
permits this taxing power.
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) state that in the absence of constraints on the
tax base and tax rate, along with unconstrained debt issuance, greater government
spending than desired by the voter/taxpayer can result. They conclude that the lack
of constraints can have a positive impact on local government revenues. In
contrast, the optimal tax theory argues for a broader base that leads to lower rates
and burdens on the voter/taxpayer. Optimal tax theory does not directly comment
on the revenue implications from broader bases and generally the broad base and
low rate approach is treated as a revenue neutral prescription. In fact, much of the
literature pertaining to tax theory presumes that government requires some
exogenously determined amount of revenue, therefore governments are equirevenue providers of goods and services. Thus, these strains of literature ignore
possible feedback effects that a tax instrument may exert and therefore the
influence it may have on the level of revenue government might seek to raise.
The appeal of the broad tax bases may change dramatically if the
government was believed to be anything other than a benevolent equi-revenue
provider. A benevolent equi-revenue providing government is one motivated to
raise an exogenously determined level of revenue to meet the voter/taxpayer's
demand for public goods and services. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that
the standard normative evaluation of an optimal tax structure depends upon this
14

equi-revenue provider assumption. The base and rate chosen by a voter/taxpayer at
the constitutional level, therefore, may be more restrictive if the government was
believed to be anything other this benevolent equi-revenue provider.
Essentially, traditional public finance assumes there is no reason to restrict
the tax base in a constitution because a tax that does not contribute to the social
welfare would never be utilized. The Leviathan view is that at the constitutional
level the voter/taxpayer would choose an inefficient base when they can not choose
tax rates along with the tax base.
Below I summarize two theories on the appropriate
comprehensiveness of a tax base.
Optimal Tax Theory
Ramsey (1927) develops an inverse elasticity rule for commodity
taxation that structures the tax rates in such a manner as to minimize the negative
impacts of the tax on voter/taxpayer utility. This method of analysis concludes that
it is appropriate to place the greatest tax burden on those goods for which supply is
the most inelastic.
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a, 1971b) contribution to the optimal tax
literature is finding that utility is maximized when the resulting change in the
marginal utility from a change in the price of a commodity is proportional to the
change in tax revenue as a result of the change in the tax rate. With respect to the
income tax the authors conclude that the optimal level of social welfare is obtained
when the “social-marginal-utility weighted changes in taxation... are proportional
to the changes in the total tax revenue.”
Auerbach (1985) examines the burdens (dead-weight loss) created by
taxation within the optimal tax framework. The author notes the important result
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that the excess burden from taxation increases by the square of the tax. This result
suggests the use of a small tax rate and a broad base over the higher rate applied to
a narrower base reduces the excess burden of a tax system.
Finally, and most importantly with respect to this study is Samuelson’s
(1986) prescription for an optimal tax structure. He offers what he describes as
“tentative conclusions” for tax policy. The fundamental premise upon which these
conclusions are built is the notion that when taxing goods and services policy
should seek to minimize the excess burden or deadweight loss of the tax. In order
to minimize the burden of the tax, Samuelson calls for taxes which people can not
avoid by changing behavior because this leads to the maximum level of loss from
the tax. Thus, optimal tax theory calls for a broad base tax structure in order to
minimize the excess burdens of the tax.
The optimal tax literature, therefore, emphasizes the need for a non-uniform
tax rate applied to a broad tax base. Wilson (1989) summarizes the issue of taxed
and untaxed commodities by noting that when all goods (i.e. leisure) are not
subject to taxation, then voter/taxpayers will shift consumption away from taxed
commodities, thus increasing distortions from taxation. He finds as this
substitution between goods becomes more elastic that a broader tax base with low
rates is preferable. This reaffirms the conclusions of the optimal tax theorists that
preceded this study. It is also important to note Wilson (1989) recognizes that
administrative cost may make non-uniformity of tax rates an impossibility and the
cost of collecting may result in a narrower base and higher rate than optimal tax
theory would prescribe.
Constitutional Approach to Taxation
The constitutional approach as developed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980)
substitutes the “passive benevolent despot” with a revenue seeking Leviathan. This
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idea of the non-passive provider of public goods is also similarly developed by
Niskanen (1971, 1975) which states that the politician/bureaucrat acts as a budget
maximizer.
Within the framework of governments engaging in maximizing behavior it is
postulated that base taxation is analogous to market price theory. Thus, the power
to tax a good is the same as providing monopoly power pricing in the sale of a
good. The optimal tax orthodoxy is challenged by Brennan and Buchanan (1977,
1978, 1980) by arguing for a limited or restricted tax base and rates in order to
reign in the government’s power to tax. Thus, with income and commodity
taxation available to the taxing authority the question arises: What fiscal policy
constraints at the constitutional level will successfully constrain a Leviathan
government’s revenue maximization?
The work of Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan’s (1980) The Power
To Tax provides a framework for a tax system which would limit the power of a
taxing authority. The approach used by Brennan and Buchanan is rooted in the late
nineteenth century fiscal exchange literature of Wicksell and others (Hettich and
Winer, 1985). The authors expound on this philosophical base for tax system
design by developing an “outcome-oriented” approach.
In Brennan and Buchanan’s (1978, 1980) discourse on taxation and fiscal
constitutions they discuss the implications of constitutional constraints on tax bases
and rates and government’s power to tax. They argue that at the constitutional level
the power to tax and the fiscal arrangements are important in constraining the
revenue generating power of governments. When the taxing authority is not an
equi-revenue provider of government services, then the tax base and rate that
would reign in the power of the government’s taxing authority would be different
than that prescribed by optimal tax theory. The tax revolts of the late 70’s and 80’s
could be viewed as an attempt by the voter/taxpayer to impose constitutional
17

constraints on the local taxing authorities when political constraints were
insufficient in restraining government revenue raising power. This would suggest
that there are specific implications that can be drawn from differences in tax base
and rate choices and their constraint on the governments’ ability to increase
spending.
Additionally, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) suggest that federalism can be a
constraint on the government’s revenue generating power. They argue “total
government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the
greater the extent which taxes and expenditures are decentralized, the more
homogenous are the separate units, the smaller the jurisdictions and the lower the
net locational rents” (p.180).
Thus, the optimal tax model prescribes the broad comprehensive base that
allows for lower rates and minimizes the excess burdens from taxation, while the
constitutional, Leviathan tax model calls for restricting the tax base, and therefore,
the power to tax.
In Search of Leviathan
Research focusing on the existence of Leviathan government behavior has
centered primarily on the notion of “market” structure and the impact of multijurisdictional competition. As noted earlier, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue
“total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus,
the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized.” Oates
(1985) was the first empirical study to examine the relationship between revenues
and the number of taxing jurisdictions, suggesting a negative relationship
supported the presence of a Leviathan government. This research found no
conclusive evidence of this negative relationship. Subsequent attempts by Bell
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(1988), Zax (1989), Forbes and Zampelli (1989) and Eberts and Gronberg (1989)
using different empirical parameters have tried to improve upon the work by Oates.
The results are mixed in their conclusions about government as a revenue
maximizer, where: Forbes and Zampelli (1989) find no evidence of Leviathan and
Bell (1988), Zax (1989), and Eberts and Gronberg (1989) do find evidence.
Epple and Zelenitz (1981) specifically developed a theoretical model to
examine the effects from government decentralization. In their model they assign
the government a profit maximization motive and demonstrate that there exists a
negative relationship between government expenditures and the number of
localities. A similar approach will be employed to develop a model of the
government's objective later in this essay. Hoyt (1998) has argued that other
government objectives, such as maximizing residents’ utility are consistent with
the negative relationship between the number of competing jurisdictions and the
expenditure level.
Nelson (1986) provides some insight that has been missing from previous
empirical and theoretical examination of the existence of Leviathan by relating a
state’s tax structures to its revenues. Nelson examines the impact on state revenue
in a single year from constraints on base and rate, as well as, the degree of
decentralization. He finds evidence of Leviathan behavior in this empirical study.
The literature regarding raising revenues to provide government goods and
services differs essentially with respect to the motivation of those taxing
authorities. When the equi-revenue taxing authority is assumed, then the broad
base-low rate approach is optimal. When a Leviathan taxing authority is assumed,
then it is preferred to constitutionally constrain the tax base available and size of
the tax rate.
In developing a positive model of a local public sector's tax structure, the
impact of the tax base, ceteris paribus, on expenditures becomes an important
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policy consideration. The two views presented on government behavior represent
polar cases of how governments perceive the value of revenues and the motivation
for generating revenue. This essay will explore the impact of tax base
comprehensiveness for revenue generating powers of local governments.
Government activity will, therefore be modeled under the premise that
governments are potentially in possession of some market power. Likewise,
governments will be able to respond to voter/taxpayer's wishes as estimated by
median voter demand. This paper will help us better understand what role tax base
constraints have on government expenditure activity in the fiscal arena and
contribute to the development of a positive model of government fiscal activity.
To determine the appropriate, positive model of government behavior an
approach similar to Nelson's will be utilized. I will, however, differ in several
important aspects. First, a panel data set of state fiscal activity and characteristics
from 1977-1992 will be used. This allows for changes in tax structure across states
and within states that should lead to a more robust analysis. Secondly, the potential
impact on expenditure levels from sales tax base comprehensiveness will be the
focus of this empirical study. The analysis will utilize structural equations derived
from the functional determinants of expenditures, base and rate choices, and
government expenditures.
Tax and Spend Causality
Before development of an empirically sound fiscal model for states, the
fundamental relationship between spending and revenues needed to be understood.
There have been a number of studies conducted to test whether revenues cause
spending or vice versa. In considering the appropriate way to model state fiscal
relationships, determining whether there might be, for example, a recursive or
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simultaneous relationship between revenues and expenditures is important. The
tax-spend hypothesis for state and local governments has yielded mixed results on
this account. Marlow and Manage (1987, 1988), and Joulfaian and Mookerjee
(1990) find a unidirectional relationship where revenues cause expenditures. Ram
(1988) on the contrary finds the relationship runs the other direction. Miller and
Rusek (1989) and Chowdbury (1988) both find bi-directional causality runs
between revenues and expenditures. Payne (1998) finds that the revenue drives
expenditure hypothesis is supported by twenty four states, eleven states causation
runs in the opposite direction, eight states support the fiscal synchronization
hypothesis and five states failed to yield results. Darrat (1998) finds that taxes
unidirectionally Granger-cause negative changes in spending consistent with the
Buchanan-Wagner hypothesis (1977, 1978). Since it remains inconclusive as to the
specific relationship between revenues and expenditures it appears appropriate to
model the revenue-expenditure decision as a simultaneous decision.
This decision to treat the revenue and expenditure decisions as a
simultaneous decision is consistent with first hand observation of the Kentucky
General Assembly. Kentucky’s General Assembly determines the appropriation of
state revenues and the development of tax law to obtain those revenues by
considering the consequences of each decision before final passage of the State’s
budget. Each biennium the legislature sets the budget and revenue priorities for
the state for the following two years. During this time negotiations take place
between the executive branch, the legislature, and among legislators. While bills
pertaining to appropriations and revenue are presented separately for vote, the
process of crafting both pieces of legislation and determining what legislation will
be brought to a vote are determined simultaneously.
Peacock and Wiseman (1961, 1979) have observed spending tends to
expand to use up the available revenue, but recent causality test do not universally
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confirm those conclusions. Moreover, experience with the Kentucky budget
process suggest that these outcomes are simultaneously determined and neither
spending nor revenue necessarily proceeds the other.

22

Chapter 3: State Tax Model and Government Budget Model
This chapter will present two separate models. The first model develops the
basis for empirically testable hypotheses. The state tax model generates these
hypotheses by contrasting the predictions of two alternative models of government
behavior. Therefore, the state tax model will allow me to highlight the implications
that arise from an increase in the tax base. These implications are dependent upon
the objective of government, utility maximization or revenue maximization.
The primary purpose of the state tax model, therefore, is to illustrate how
Leviathan objectives can arise in a conventional optimal tax framework and to
develop a basis from which to test empirically the presumptions on the government
objective functions. As noted earlier, these objectives follow from two different
views of government. In the Leviathan model of government an inefficient tax base
would be chosen by the governed if they can not choose the rates along with the
base . In the traditional public finance literature there is no reason to place
restrictions on the tax base because a tax which does not maximize social welfare
would never be utilized.
The second model, the government budget model, generates the framework
for the econometric model developed in Chapter 4. The government budget model
sets the framework from which the system equations that are necessary to
empirically examine the impact the tax base has on expenditures.
A Simple State Tax Model
Following, Hoyt (2001), I consider a model with a single state government
and n local governments. Each locality has a single (representative) resident. The
residents are identical and therefore, in equilibrium, each locality will choose the
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same policies. Each government finances a public service to provide to its residents
with gs being the level provided by the state government. The public services are
produced with constant costs with the cost function for the state government
service cf(gs) =ngs.
In addition to the public services the residents consume, they also consume
private commodities. Following, Wilson (1989), I consider a continuum of these
private commodities identified on the interval [0,1]. We denote the gross of tax
price of commodity i by q(i) with the net price of all commodities being unity. I
assume identical demand functions over the set of commodities. That is, when
prices are identical, the quantity demanded is the same for the commodities.
The set taxed by the state government is denoted by Bs and are the commodities in the interval [0, k s ]. I denote the lengths of this interval by ks.
When the state can only set a single tax rate, then
q (i ) = 1

i Ï Bs

1+t s

(3.1)

i Î Bs

One example of a utility function that would generate the demand functions
I desire is the CES utility function,
Uj =

(s -1) / s
ì1
ü
s
ln í ò [ x(i ) ]
di ý +
s - 1 î0
þ

Vs ( g s ) .

(3.2)

where s is the elasticity of substitution and we assume
¶Vs
º Vgs > 0 and
¶g s

¶ 2Vs
º Vg 2 < 0, . Then given income of y, the demand for
s
¶g s2

commodity i is given by
q (i ) x(i ) =

q (i )1-s
1

ò q (k )

1-s

(3.3)

y
dk

0

I denote the derivatives of the demand with respect to price by
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x11 º

¶x(k )
¶x(k )
and x21 º
, k , i ¹ k . Then the associated indirect utility
¶q (k )
¶q (i )

function is
é
ù
s 1ê
q(i ) -s ú
V [ q, g s ] =
ò ê ln
ú
s - 1 0 ê 1 q(k )1-s dk ú
ò
ëê 0
ûú

s -1
s

di + Vs ( g s )

(3.4)

Let the first term of V[q, gs] , the sub-utility function with respect to prices,
1

be denoted by òV(q(k))dk .
0

When the state can only set a single tax rate the state tax base is given by

(

)

t s ò x(i )di = t s X s = t s ks (1+t s ) -s A = ng s
Bs

(a)

(3.5)

where Xs denotes the state tax base and for CES demand function is given by
expression (a) where A = ( ( Kl - ks ) + k s (1 + t s )1-s ) .
-1

Policy Choice with a Single Government and Public Service
To make the nature of expanding tax bases more apparent my analysis
considers the decisions of a single level of government providing a single public
service. For our purposes, think of this as the state government providing only a
state public service. I consider two alternative objectives of the government, utility
maximization and revenue maximization.
Utility Maximization
If the state government seeks to maximize resident’s utility then the problem
is to
1

(3.6)

s
Maximize ò V (q )dk + V ( g s )
t

0
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where gs is defined by the balance budget constraint defined in (3.5).
The first order condition is
ks

Vi = ò

0

¶V (q(k ))
¶V
dk +
¶q(k )
¶g s

(

ks
é ks
æ ks ¶x(k )
æ ¶x(i ) ö ö ù
x
i
t
di
+
+
(
)
êò
òç
s ç ò
÷ dk ÷ di ú dt = 0
q
i
q
k
¶
¶
(
)
(
)
0
0
êë 0
è
ø ø úû
è

)

= -Vy ks x + Vg s éë k s x + t s ks x11 + k 2 s x21 ùû = 0
or

(3.7)

Vy ks éë - x + MRS s {k + t s ( x11 + x12 )}ùû = 0

where MRSs =Vg/Vy, the marginal rate of substitution between the
public service and the private good. Alternatively we can express (3.7) as
MRS =

x

(3.7’)

x + t s ( x11 + k s x21 )

To find the impact of a change in the tax rate as a result of an increase in the
tax base we differentiate (3.7) to get
Vtk
dt
=- s
dks
Vtt

(3.8)

where Vtt <0 by the second-order condition, therefore
æ dt ö
sign ç
÷ = sign Vtks
è dk s ø

( )

(3.9)

where
é
ù
¶MRS s ¶g s
Vtks = Vy ks ê MRS s x21 +
( x + ts ( x11 + ks x21 ) )ú
¶g s ¶ks
ë
û

from the first order conditions,

26

(3.10)

x + ts ( x11 + ks x21 ) =

x
MRS s

so
é
g s ¶MRS s 1 ù
Vtk = Vy k s ê MRS s t s x21 +
ú
MRS s ¶g s ks û
ë
= Vy k s [ MRS s ts x21 + Emrs ]
where
Emrs < 0

(3.11)

In (3.11), whether there is a tax rate reduction as a result of a base increase
depends whether those private commodities not in the tax base are gross substitutes
or complements with those commodities in the tax base. The assumption of gross
substitution with the tax base may not hold as the base begins to include most of
the consumer goods, rather the untaxed base may become more complementary.
Thus, when government chooses the base and rates to maximize utility, then
depending on whether private goods not in the base remain gross substitutes, the
base increase may lead to lower tax rates or higher rates.
Revenue maximization
Now consider the case in which the government is a “Leviathan”, that is, it
is choosing its tax policy to maximize tax revenue. In this case its objective is
ks

Maximize t ò x(k )dk
t

(3.13)

0

ks

s.t. t ò x(k )dk = ng s
0

The first order condition for (3.13) is
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æ é ks ¶x(k ) ¶x(i ) ù ö
= ò x(k )dk + t s ç ê ò
+
dk di ÷
ç ê 0 ¶q(k ) ¶q(k ) úú ÷
0
û ø
èë
ks

= k s x + t s ( ks x11 + k 2 s x12 ) = 0

(3.14)

Which gives
ts =

x
x11 + ks x12

(3.15)

Analagous to the utility maximizing case, by totally differentiating (3.14)
with respect to ks gives
Vtk
dt
x
= - s = 12
dk s
Vtt Vtt

(3.16)

Since Vtt<0 by the second order condition we have
ì ¶t ü
sign í s ý = sign( x12 )
î ¶k s þ

(3.17)

If commodities are gross substitutes, then expanding the base increase the
tax rate. With gross complements the tax rate decreases. The impact on total
revenue is again given by (3.12). However, in this case, the second term of (3.12)
is equal to zero by the envelope theorem (the tax rate chosen to maximize
revenue), therefore making
æ ks
ö
d ç t ò x(k )dk ÷
è 0
ø = x(k ) > 0
s
dks

(3.18)

Note that while with utility maximization the tax rate could increase and
revenue will increase with expansion of the tax base, these increases are always
less than the expansion occurring when government maximizes revenue.
Equations (3.16) and (3.18) generate the predictions to be tested. First, in
(3.16) when government chooses the base and rates to maximize utility, then
depending on whether private commodities not in the base remain gross
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substitutes, the base increase will lead to lower tax rates. Secondly, in (3.18), if
revenue maximization is the objective, then we get no change in rates and an
increase in revenues from a tax base increase. Therefore, the following hypotheses
to be tested are
Hypothesis 1: Tax bases and rates are inversely related.
Hypothesis 2: Tax base expansion leads to higher expenditures.
The first hypothesis relates to the standard optimal tax formula of broader
bases and lower tax rates. Generally, this base-rate adjustment would be considered
revenue neutral and serves to reduce the excess burden of the tax. The second
hypothesis generated by the model relates directly to whether tax base broadness
allows government the opportunity to increase spending through revenue
expansion. The next step towards testing these hypotheses is to develop a model
that describes the system within which, tax rates, bases and expenditures are
determined.
A General Government Budget Model
In order to test the hypotheses generated from the tax model above, a
framework must be established for the development of an econometric model.
What follows is a general derivation of a government budget model. In order to
consider the different possible objectives that exist for government, I use an
approach similar to one used by Brennan and Buchanan (1980). This approach
does not necessarily presuppose a specific objective function for government. They
simply define any difference between the revenue raised and the demand for public
goods as surplus, S and note that government decision makers are constrained in
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the surplus available since some of the total revenue generated must go to meet the
demand for public goods and services, G. Thus,
S=R-G

and G = aR

(3.19)

If a equals 1 then the government is acting, or at least is constrained
sufficiently so as to act, as an equi-revenue provider or utility maximizing
government. Otherwise, some surplus is accruing to government.
S= (1 - a)R for aÎ(0,1]

(3.19’)

This concept of surplus revenues could manifest itself in various forms. One
possible explanation is developed as a principal-agent problem similar to what can
be found in the industrial organization literature.
The principal-agent problem arises when the purchaser of services (the
principal) does not have full information about the circumstances faced by the
provider of those services (the agent). As a result the agent is able to serve it’s own
end rather than the principal’s. The principal-agent problem for government can
result in, for example, rent-seeking behavior by bureaucrats or a loss in operational
efficiency.
The model above implies increases in the tax base may make available more
surplus to government. If, however, the surplus available to government is fixed,
then an increase in the tax base would find as Brennan and Buchanan (1980) assert
that “such a broadening would lead to a higher level of tax revenues and of public
goods supply than the citizen-taxpayer desires.”
Surplus could be thought of as fixed, since typically beyond some level of
surplus political pressure could supplant the current bureaucratic system, thus
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constraining the ability of government to increase its surplus. The increase in the
base is analogous to a price increase, thus motivating the producer (government) to
increase output. Since, the power to tax affords the government the ability to
provide to the market more than would be demanded if price was constrained to
short run marginal cost, then base broadening beyond some desirable level would
lead to a higher supply of government goods and services, thus higher total
expenditures.
Therefore, the relationship between the tax base and government
expenditures must be incorporated into a state government budget model. While
the surplus available to government can not be explicitly determined within a
budget model, the financing of government expenditures and the demand for
government goods and services can be modeled.
This model is developed from previous work, as noted in this and previous
chapters. The maximizing behavior framework of governments requires that
revenues be maximized subject to constraints on base, rate and taxing power.
Therefore, to provide a given level of the public good revenue, R*, must be raised,
such that:
R* = R(b, r, c)

(3.20)

Budget Model System of Equations
Equation (3.20) says a government raises revenue subject to the constraints
on tax base (including debt issuance), b, tax rates and limits, r, and the degree of
competitiveness (or degree of centralization) facing each taxing jurisdiction, c.
Equation (3.20) suggests, that revenue maximizing occurs independent of public
good demand and is consistent with a pure Leviathan model of government
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ignoring the demand for government expenditures. There exist a demand for the
public good, however, where,
G* = G(Y,z)

(3.21)

Equation (3.21) says that the demand for public goods is a function of
income, Y, and characteristics of the population, z. This relationship can be
expressed as an augmentation of the median voter models introduced by
Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and, Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). Equations
(3.20) and (3.21) represent a system of equations which must be considered in
testing the hypothesis on tax base size and government spending.
Additionally, states have been subject to voter imposed base and rate
limitations. Empirical evidence on the effects of these constraints have been
inconclusive. The difficulty with these studies is in characterizing government
behavior in the absence of the limitations (Dye and McGuire, 1992). In developing
equation (3.20) inclusion of a state tax and rate limitation indicator variable needs
to be included. Federal transfers also need to be included to control for additional
revenue available to the states and expenditure incentives created by these
transfers.
In addition to equation (3.20) and (3.21) there are the budget identity and
revenue identity. The budget identity is where total expenditures equal sales
revenue, other revenue, federal transfers, and borrowing.
Expenditures = Sales Revenue + Other Revenue +
Federal Transfers + Borrowing

(3.22)

The revenue identity is just the product of the tax base and tax rate.
Tax Revenue = tax rate · tax base

(3.23)
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Equations (3.21) - (3.23) must be augmented by tax base and rate equations
since they are endogenously determined in the budget. As noted by Wilson (1989),
base and rate decisions are jointly determined. The issue of endogeneity is
enhanced by the fact that the sample data will encompass a 16 year time period. In
a one year sample it could be argued that bases and rates can be treated as
exogenous when spending based on revenue forecasts are considered, this clearly
is not the case when considering longitudinal data (in chapter five a test for the
endogeneity of the tax base in the government expenditure equation will be
performed). Therefore, one solution is to model the determinants of the base and
rate choices in a given year. These base and rate choices become part of the model
and are endogenous.
Since it can be argued that the base and rate are both endogenous variables,
it is appropriate to consider what exogenous factors influence these variables. The
tax base can be characterized as a function of government spending, G, tax rate, r,
political factors, p, socioeconomic factors, z, and tax and expenditure limits, tel.
Thus it follows that,
b* = b(G*, r*, p, z, tel)

(3.24)

Similarly, arguments can be made for the tax rate such that tax rate decisions
are a function of government spending, tax base, political factors and tax and
expenditure limits
r* = r(G*, b*, p, z, tel)

(3.25)

Since equations (3.21) - (3.25) represent a system of equation where
government expenditures, tax base, and tax rate are simultaneously determined,
then the relationships in this system of equations can be estimated. Chapter Four
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employs this general equation framework to construct an econometric model in
order to test the hypotheses formulated in the first part of this chapter.
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Chapter 4: Econometric Model and Estimation Procedure
Many studies have estimated the demand for state and local expenditures,
including Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973).
While no consensus on the variables that determine government spending seems to
exist, recent studies including Abrams and Dougan (1986) and Alm and Evers
(1991) provide some assistance in determining what explanatory variables are
appropriate to consider. Therefore, following previous work and the relationships
suggested in Chapter Three, a simultaneous equations econometric model of
government finances is developed.
Model of State Finance
The state budget model consist of five structural equations and two
identities. By structural equation, I mean an equation that, in addition to an
endogenous variable, has a predetermined component, a stochastic component, and
characterizes underlying economic theory.
The equations in the econometric model are presented in log-linear
functional form. The subscript it denotes the state, i, and the year, t. For example,
Sales Revenueit represents the natural log of a State's sales revenues in time t. The
first two equations are the two identities, the sales tax revenue identity and the
budget identity. The identities do not contain a stochastic component, they are
simply an additive or multiplicative relationship. Moreover, there are no variable
coefficients associated with these identities
Sales Revenueit = Sales Tax Baseit + Sales Tax Rateit
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(4.1)

The sales revenue identity simply implies that revenue from the general sales
tax is a function of the size of the tax base chosen and the sales tax rate, where the
tax rate times the tax base equals sales revenue. The sales tax base is a ratio of the
base taxed to the size of the base available for taxation. Both the sales tax rate and
base are simultaneously determined in the model.
The Budget Identity equates expenditures and revenues including the current
period issuance of debt.
Expendituresit = Sales Tax Revenueit + Other Revenueit + Federal Transfersit
+ Borrowit

(4.2)

Other revenue is a state's own revenue less the revenues generated from the
general sales tax. Other revenues are exogenous in this model. Borrow is the
change in a state's short-term debt and the amount of long-term debt issued. All the
states except for Vermont have a balanced budget requirement, but there are few
occasions during the time period that states do not issue either short or long term
debt, or both.
The Expenditure demand equation is an augmented demand for government
spending equation. The traditional median voter demand equation is augmented to
include variables that describe the state fiscal environment similar to recent studies
by Abrams and Dougan (1986), Holtz-Eakin (1988), Alms and Evers (1991) and
Poterba (1995).
Expendituresit = b0 + b1Federal Transfersit + b2TELit + b3XitE +
b4Zit + b5Sales Tax Baseit + ee

(4.3)
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The Expenditure equation includes the endogenous variables Federal
Transfers, TEL, and the Sales Tax Base. States with higher relative transfers are
expected to have higher government spending levels. Tax and expenditure limits,
TEL, while arguably may or may not effect spending outcomes, they do reflect
voter and legislative intent with respect to spending activity. The Sales Tax Base is
simultaneously determined in the budget process and is hypothesized to have a
positive impact on expenditure outcomes. Additionally, political-socioeconomic
variables, as summarized by the notation XitE and Zit, are included in the spending
decision.
The Sales Tax Base equation includes determinants that explain the choice
of the base size for a state.
Sales Tax Baseit = d0 + d1Sales Tax Rateit + d2Expendituresit + d3Number
Legislatureit + d4XitSB + d5Zit + eb

(4.4)

This choice of base size, the percent of the available sales base that is taxed,
is a function of the state's economic stability, revenue from other sources, the sales
tax rate, current expenditures, number of elected legislators (Campbell, 1994),
border states base sizes as measured by the weighted average of adjoining state tax
bases, and other political-socioeconomic state characteristics.
The Sales Tax Rate equation includes determinants that explain the choice of
the tax rate.
SalesTax Rateit = f0 + f1 XitSLR + f2Sales Tax Baseit + f3Eit
+ f3Zit + f4TELit + eslr

(4.5)
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The sales tax rate is a function of cross border tax competition as measured
by the weighted average of adjoining state tax rates, other revenue, rate of total
taxation as measured by total tax revenue divided by personal income , forecasted
change in revenue needs, expenditures, political-socioeconomic characteristics, the
relative sales tax base chosen, and the presence of a TEL.
The final two structural equations indirectly influence the budget process,
but are very much endogenous to that process. This is particularly true when
examining the process over a period of time. Where and when TEL’s are binding,
the budget process may be constrained. The existence of a TEL at the state level
can suggest, as well, that the budget process was perceived to need some constraint
or additional oversight.
The federal transfers a state receives are often directly tied to budgetary
spending decisions of the state. Thus, both TEL’s and federal transfers exhibit
endogenous characteristics and as such are included as structural equations in the
state budget model. Following work by Shedbagian (1999) these variables will be
estimated using the separate structural equations below and the predicted values
will be used as instruments in the other structural equations.
TELit = m0 + m1Directit + m2Federal Transfersit + m3Zit + etel

(4.6)

Federal Transfersit = x0 + x1Expendituresit + x2Local Expendituresit
+ x3Povrateit-1 + x4Unempit-1 + x5Zit + ef

(4.7)

Table 4.1 on the following page list the five structural equations and the
independent variables found in each equation.
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Table 4.1 Structural Equation Variables
Expenditure
Equation

Sales Tax Base
Equation

Sales Tax
Rate Equation

Per Capita
Federal
Transfers

Tax and
Expenditure
Limits

Sales Tax Base
Per Capita
Federal Transfers
TEL

Sales Tax Rate
Taxation of
Personal Income
Per Capita
Expenditures
Per Capita
Private Income
Per Capita Other
Revenue
Border Base

Sales Tax Base
Number of
Legislators
Per Capita
Expenditures
TEL

Expenditures
Per Capita Local
Expenditures
Unemployment
Rate (t-1)
Poverty Rate (t1)
Percent under 18

Direct
Per Capita
Federal Transfers
Percent under 18

Per Capita
Private Income
Unemployment
Rate
Per Capita Local
Transfers
Per Capita Local
Expenditures
Per Capita
Borrowing
Upper Distance

Border Rate

Change in
Income (t-2)
Change in
Revenue (t-2)
Number of
Legislators
Per Capita
Private GSP
Percent under 18

Change Total
Revenue(t-1)
Taxation of
Personal Income
Per Capita
Private Income
Per Capita Other
Revenue
Per Capita
Private GSP
Percent under 18

Percent 65 and
over
Population
Density
Population
Growth
Poverty Rate

Percent 65 and
over
Population
Density
Population
Growth
Poverty Rate

constant

constant

constant

constant

constant

state indicators

state indicators

state indicators

state indicators

state indicators

year indicators

year indicators

year indicators

year indicators

Lower Distance
Governor
Per Capita
Private GSP
Percent under 18
Percent 65 and
over
Population
Density
Population
Growth
Poverty Rate
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Percent 65 and
over
Population
Density
Population
Growth
Poverty Rate

Percent 65 and
over
Population
Density
Population
Growth
Poverty Rate

Estimation of the State Budget Model
The data consists of a sample of 748 observations that includes all the states
except Alaska and Nebraska for the years 1977 -1992. Alaska was excluded
because of its unique fiscal structure where the primary tax base is its natural
resources. Thus, there is a significant amount of tax exporting, as well as a high
degree of federal intergovernmental transfers into that state. Nebraska was
excluded because of its unique unicameral legislative body. Because party strength
can be an important determinant of budgetary outcomes, rather than construct a
separate model to describe Nebraska’s legislative characteristics, it was omitted
from the sample. Inclusion of Nebraska, otherwise, would require the undesirable
omission of party strength variables from the model.
The observations represent a panel data set with both cross-sectional and
time series characteristics and the model is a multiple equations model representing
a system of simultaneous equations. Both of these conditions suggest ordinary least
squares estimation of the equations would lead to inconsistent and inefficient
parameter estimates.
Two methods for estimating longitudinal data sets of this nature are fixed
effects and random effects procedures. A common formulation for state
longitudinal data is to assume that differences across states can be captured in
differences in the constant term (Greene, 1993). Thus, the fixed effects estimation
will be employed. Because the unit sample size and the number of states is small, a
least squares dummy variable model is used where an nT x n matrix of dummies,
D, is included in the estimation. Additional specifications will explore the
importance of time fixed effects in addition to the state fixed effects. Thus, the
model , with time effects, can be expressed by
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Yit = Dig + Dta +Xitb + eit
This model is referred to as the least squares dummy variable model, where
Di and Dt are state and time dummy variables. This is a classical regression model
with all the usual properties and can be estimated with ordinary least squares.
The simultaneity inherent in the system creates an additional problem
because the explanatory variables are correlated with the error terms of the
structural equations, thus ordinary least squares delivers biased estimates of the
structural coefficients. As a result, an alternative instrumental variable approach is
needed to estimate these equations.
The issue of endogeneity is enhanced by the fact that the sample data will
encompass a 16 year time period. In a one year sample it could be argued that
bases, rates, TEL’s, and federal transfers may be exogenous to spending decisions
based on revenue forecasts. That assumption is debatable for a single year
estimation, but clearly is not the case when considering longitudinal data. Also, as
noted by Wilson (1989) base and rate decisions are jointly determined. This
simultaneity would need to be corrected for in the final estimation of the structural
equations regardless of the time frame.
Before an instrumental variable approach can be successful, the structural
equations must be identified. An under-identified structural equation cannot be
estimated. One test of the identification of a structural equation is the Order
Condition (Greene, 1993).
The state budget model meet this necessary condition for identification,
therefore, the structural equations of interest will be estimable using the
instrumental variable approach. To assure identification of the endogenous
variables, in Chapter Five an additional test will be performed to confirm
identification of each equation.
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In order to mitigate problems from heteroschedastic disturbances within the
model, the variables, where appropriate, will be expressed in per capita terms. A
primary source for heteroschedasticity in studies of states is the differences in
populations between the states. Per capita adjustments is a method to apply equal
weights to the variables that enter the estimation. The adjustment by population is
similar in approach to a weighted least squares estimation and is a standard
approach for ridding government expenditure models of heteroschedasticity
(Studenmund, 1997).
The fixed effects state budget model will be estimated using STATA
statistical software. Three-stage least squares instrumental variable approach will
be used to estimate the structural equations (tables in Chapter Five will report the
estimation results for the expenditure, sales tax base, and sales tax rate equations).
Three-stage least squares is a system method of estimation and thus is a technique
used for joint estimation of an entire system of equations. It is essentially an
equation by equation two-stage least square estimation. Two stage least squares is
a method that systematically creates instrumental variables from the exogenous
variables in the system to replace the endogenous variables.
Thus, three stage least square estimation involves the application of
generalized least squares to a system of equations, each of which has been
estimated using two stage least squares. The three stage least squares procedure
can be shown to produce more efficient parameter estimates because it takes into
account cross-equation correlations. This approach is used for two reasons. It is
operationally efficient, and more importantly this approach provides consistent and
asymptotically efficient parameter estimates.
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Data and Variables
There are 748 observations on 48 states covering the years 1977 -1992. A
table of all the variables , including variable name and sources, is at the end of this
chapter. Since the data set covers 16 years, all nominal dollar values are adjusted
by the CPI index, all dollar amounts are in 1982 dollars. Nominal dollars were
adjusted using the U. S. Census Bureau CPI-U. All non-indicator variables will be
in natural logarithms and the structural equations will be estimated using the loglinear functional form. Four states, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and
Oregon, do not have a general sales tax, their tax revenues, rates and base size are
set to 1 X10-9. Thus, the log of these variables for these states are equal to zero.
Likewise, since Hawaii does not have any neighboring states, the weighted average
of the neighboring states tax rate and tax base will be zero and the correction
outlined above will be used.
Variables in the Structural Equations
Expenditure Equation
The expenditure equation adopts the often used median voter demand model
for government spending as introduced by Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). Three variables primarily influence the demand
for government services: the State's personal income, federal transfers into the
state, and the State's population.
Yousefi and Abizadeh (1992) argue that personal income is endogenous
with government expenditures since these expenditures are part of personal income
and should not, therefore, be treated as exogenous. They demonstrate that this
problem can be avoided by subtracting government spending from personal
43

income to yield private income. That technique is employed here when
constructing the personal income variables for this model.
The expenditure demand equation is augmented by including other political
and socioeconomic variables, as well as other variables that influence state
expenditure outcomes.
First, there are tax and expenditure limits (TEL) and federal transfers
included in the expenditure equation. Since the presence of a TEL signals that the
voting public believes revenues and/or expenditures may potentially exceed
desired levels. The TEL, as noted earlier, is an endogenous indicator variable in the
finance system, where a value of one indicates that a TEL effects the states
financing decisions. TEL's that take on a value of one are actual limitations on state
revenue and spending and should reduce the state revenue. Skidmore (1999) found
that only those TEL's which are enacted with actual restrictions on state revenue
and spending activity had significant impact. Some states have advisory
restrictions, but these advisories were found to have no impact on state
expenditures and revenues. TEL's can have a negative impact on expenditures, but
states that have enacted TEL's may have higher expenditures, ceteris paribus,
therefore the coefficient may be positive.
Federal transfers represents the total dollars transferred into a state from the
federal government (determinants of federal transfers, as well as TEL’s, will be
discussed in more detail below). Federal transfers are formulaically tied to personal
income and as such decline with increases in personal income. Because of the
matching characteristics of many of the transfers, these transfers are often
complementary with state expenditures. Thus, the federal government's use of
grants with matching characteristics may tend to increase state expenditures. This
effect is often referred to in the context of the "flypaper" effect, but conclusive
findings of this effect have been called into question, Bailey and Connolly (1998).
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Oates (1985) considers a state's share of total tax revenues a measure of the
degree of centralized taxing authority in the state. Nelson (1987) argues that
because states differ in the way they allocate services, the State’s share of tax
revenue may not measure centralized taxing power. He cites, as an example, states
with a demand for higher elementary and secondary education will have lower
state shares, but may not have any less centralization of taxing power from those
states with a lower demand. He reasons that since these services are traditionally
provided at the local level, those states will have lower state shares even though the
division of taxing powers are the same for both states.
Since this analysis does not intend to directly measure the centralization
effects on state spending, variables measuring local transfers and local
expenditures will be included instead of the tax share measure employed by
Nelson. These variables are intended to control for intrastate spending activity
since they could influence the level of state expenditures.
Local transfers are the dollar amounts of intergovernmental transfer of state
revenues to the local governments within the state. With respect to state
expenditures, higher per capita transfers to local governments may increase the
demand for spending at the state level.
If a state’s overall tax structure is such that much of government spending is
borne primarily at the local level then the need for greater expenditures at the state
level will be lessened. If on the other hand, the demands on state spending are
similar at the local level, then you would expect states with higher local
government spending to also have higher state government spending levels.
Other variables that could be included as determinants of expenditures are
fiscal policy constraints, such as the presence of a balanced budget requirement or
line item veto. Holtz-Eakin (1988), Alm and Evers (1991) among others find that
the line item veto has no impact on state spending. Similarly, while every state
45

except Vermont has a balanced budget requirement, the effectiveness has been
limited to a state's ability to run a deficit. Because evidence from these studies
suggest neither of these budget rules impact state expenditures, they are not
included in the Expenditure equation.
In addition, Poterba (1995) finds little evidence that debt limitation
requirements effect state debt. Additionally, Von Hagen (1991) finds state debt
limits have no significant impact on per capita debt. Abrams and Dougan (1986)
do not find that borrowing limits impact state spending levels. Poterba (1994) and
Bohn and Inman (1996) find balance budget rules may matter with respect to
deficits but, state borrowing constraints or debt limitations whether constitutional
or statutory have little or no impact on a state's willingness to issue debt. For these
reasons debt limitations are not included in the Expenditure equation.
As noted earlier, Brennan and Buchanan (1978, 1980) hypothesized that
access to debt finance, ceteris paribus, positively influences the amount of
Leviathan's revenue-maximizing power. In Nelson's study he found that debt limits
significantly and negatively influenced per capita tax revenues. The variable
Borrow, the sum of per capita long-term debt issued and the change in per capita
short-term debt for the year, is a proxy for a state's willingness and ability to issue
debt in the state's budget. The use of this variable is consistent with Von Hagen's
findings that per capita debt is higher in states with weak budget rules. If states can
defer current revenue needs through borrowing, then higher levels of per capita
borrowing would lead to higher state expenditures.
The next variable is the state unemployment rate. This variable is a proxy for
the current period business cycle. The business cycle can directly influence the
revenue stream and expenditure demands within the state. Rather than using the
national rate, the state rates will be used to distinguish between regional
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differences in the business cycle. The unemployment rate was chosen because it is
a good within period indicator of the business cycle.
Finally, the political environment of the state is included consistent with
Holtz-Eakin (1988) and others in augmenting the expenditure demand equation.
Three variables will be used to describe the political environment of budget
decisions. The first variable, Governor, is a binary variable which equals one if the
State's governor is a Democrat and zero otherwise. The next two variables are
measures of the political strength in the upper and lower chambers of the state’s
legislature. Caplan (2001) shows how both parties tend to make government larger
as the likelihood of electoral success increases. He proxies the likelihood of reelection success by the use of a “distance” variable. That approach is used here,
where upper and lower chamber “distance” is measured as the absolute value of the
percent of Democrats4 less 0.5. This gives the absolute value of the distance
between 50 percent and the percent of seats held by the party in power. The
distance variable is a proxy measuring the degree of inter-party competition and
because the variable is in absolute terms it represents party strength regardless of
party.
This competition, as Caplan finds, may be associated with higher spending
because representatives may use spending to assure their incumbency and retention
of party strength. Also, as party strength or “distance” increases, special interest
spending increases as fear of reprisal by voters decreases.
In addition to state and political variables, the socioeconomic characteristics
(Z) are included. Those variables are: private personal income, discussed above;
private Gross State Product, the state Gross State Product less government product;
state population characteristics including, a one period change in population ( this
4

This could have been calculated as the percent of Republicans and obtained the same results. The distance measure would have
yielded the same results.
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variable is squared before taking logs, in a few instances states experienced
negative annual growth); the population density; the percent of the population
under 18; the percent over 65; and the states poverty rate.
Sales Tax Base Equation
There are 46 states that raise revenues with a general sales tax. Wilson
(1989) notes that the tax base choice and the rate of taxation are jointly determined.
Therefore, both the sales tax base choice and the sales tax rate are simultaneously
determined within the state budget model.
In order to calculate the tax base size or coverage I follow the formula used
by Metcalf (1993). The base choice is measured as the part of the base which is
subject to the sales tax divided by the Gross State Product (GSP) as measured by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The sales base variable therefore, is calculated
by taking the actual base taxed divided by GSP. The numerator is constructed by
dividing the general sales tax revenue by the sales tax rate. This ratio represents the
fraction of the sales base that is taxed. This fraction of the tax base that is taxed is
then divided by the private GSP. I differ from Metcalf by only using the private
GSP, the total GSP less government product. The private GSP serves as a proxy
for the tax base available for the application of a general sales tax and government
activity is typically exempt from the general sales tax.
Ring (1999) has shown that only 59 percent of a state’s sales tax revenues
are from final consumption goods, the balance are from predominately
intermediate goods. This indicates the sales tax is not a pure flat tax on final
consumption. He notes the cascading effect created by the taxation of intermediate
goods. A state’s taxing of intermediate goods could alter the actual broadness of
the tax base. In measuring the tax broadness, as noted, the GSP is used as the
potential base, a “value-added” measure of state production, this should help
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mitigate the problems in measuring base broadness when states rely on
intermediate goods for part of their tax base. The GSP does, however, include the
value of imputed rent from owner-occupied housing as well as rental income from
housing, neither of which would be considered a potential part of the sales tax
base. Because there is the potential of cascading effects and tax exporting, and the
inclusion of rent values, the GSP is not a perfect measure of the available tax base,
but it is a broader more comprehensive measure than the next best alternative,
which is personal income.
The components of personal income include wages and salaries, rental
income, dividends and interest, and transfer payments. This in many respects is
similar to GSP, but is narrower in that it does not consider all business activity in
the state. GSP, on the other hand, is the value added in production by the labor and
property located in a state. Because GSP is calculated as the gross output minus
intermediate inputs it could be considered as yet again to narrow a measure based
on Ring's findings. The GSP does include any taxes paid by the business, however,
therefore it seems the most appropriate and best measure to capture the potential
tax base available to the state
Since the Bureau of Economic Analysis calculates the GSP for each state the
dollar values are consistently measured for each state.
The sales tax rate is the general sales tax rate for the state. This variable, as
noted, is endogenously determined.
The determinants of the tax base chosen by a state, includes the rate of
taxation on the base as noted above. Also, of importance is the percent of personal
income collected from all other tax sources within the state. This variable is a
proxy for the dependence of the state on taxation of other source for its revenue. A
greater percent of personal income going to other taxes in the state will reduce the
size of the tax base.
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The state budget process includes the simultaneous occurrence of setting the
size of the budget and the bases and rates necessary to create revenues to equate
expenditures. Thus in both the sales tax base and rate equations, expenditures can
be an important determinant.
Private income and other state socioeconomic characteristics summarized as,
Z, as well as the amount of tax competition from other states as proxied by the
variable Border Base, a population weighted average of the surrounding states tax
bases are included in the equation. The border base variable would be positive
leading to larger base sizes, if states believe that base broadening will not have
negative border effects for their state.
Campbell (1994), suggests that the number of state constitutionally elected
legislatures could positively influence the base broadness probability, this variable
will be included in the sales tax base equation.
Additionally, as discussed by Dye and McGuire (1992) and Holcombe and
Sobel (1995), the choice of a tax base can be partially motivated by the need to
smooth revenue flows across time. The need for a smoother flowing revenue
stream is increased by rising demand for public goods and services. They argue
that revenue stability is an important concern for expanding the tax base.
Therefore, variables that measure the changes in not only revenue but, private
income within a state can help explain the base structure chosen by the state. Since
these variances may be negative, the square of the two-period lagged variance will
be used. The larger the variance, from one period to the next, would suggest a
greater probability in choosing a broad based sales tax.
Other revenue is included as a control for other sources of revenue available
to the state from taxation and other sources. Other revenue is the total own source
revenue less the sales tax revenue.
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Sales Tax Rate Equation
The sales rate equation includes many of the same variables as the sales tax
base equation. The sales tax base which is simultaneously determined would have
a negative impact on the rate. As noted above, current expenditures are included in
the sales tax rate equation since an increase in expenditures will place pressure on
states to increase the base, the rate, or both. This pressure is assumed when holding
other revenues constant and forcing a balanced budget with little or no borrowing.
Similarly, forecasted changes in revenue as proxied by the actual revenue, Rit, less
the previous years revenue, Rit-1, would impact the sales tax rate decision.
Another endogenous variable, TEL, is include in the structural equation. The
presence of a TEL may provide a direct constraint on the tax rate chosen in any
given year by a state.
The overall tax rate of personal income again will have a positive impact on
the sales tax rate for the same reasons it positively impacts the sales tax base. The
reliance on other revenue sources in the state will negatively influence the sales tax
rate. Private income and other state socioeconomic characteristics summarized as,
Z, are included.
The amount of sales tax rate competition from other states as proxied by the
variable Border Rate, a population weighted average of the surrounding states tax
rates is included in the equation. The border rate variable would be positive leading
to larger state sales tax rates, this will occur if states believe that rate increases will
not have negative border effects for their state.
Tax and Expenditure Limitations
Tax and expenditure limits are those limits which constrain the states growth
in tax revenues or expenditures. As mentioned earlier only those state's which

51

passed actual limits are considered to have an effective limit. Actual limits must be
overridden with a super majority vote or through a declaration of emergency by the
governor. Those states with advisory limits are not considered as having an
effective tax or expenditure limit. Advisory limits are often statutory limits that can
be changed through a simple majority vote. Fifteen states have an actual tax or
expenditure limit or both.
Early studies on TEL's found little effectiveness in reducing tax revenue or
expenditures. These earlier studies considered the TEL to be an exogenous shock.
The exogeneity of this shock has been challenged in recent literature. Recent works
by Poterba (1995), Rueben (1995) and Shadbegian (1998, 1999) find that TEL's
are endogenous to a state's finance structure. Since the endogeneity issue may have
a significant impact on statistical inferences, this model treats TEL's as endogenous
and the equation above will be used to create an instrument for the TEL dummy. In
constructing the equation for a TEL the key, as with all the structural equations, is
to find a variable that is correlated with the dependent variable, the probability of
passing a TEL, but is otherwise uncorrelated with the sales tax base, rate, and
expenditures of the budget system.
Rueben uses citizen direct legislation laws5, Direct, which should be
positively related to the passage of TEL's, but unrelated to current bases, rates, and
expenditures. These direct legislation laws were passed early in the previous
century and will not influence current budgetary outcomes, but would increase the
probability of passing TEL legislation. Florida, Illinois, and Wyoming are
excluded from the list of those states with direct legislation, as suggested by
Rueben, since they passed direct legislation provisions recently (1978, 1970, and
1968, respectively).
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Additional determinants used in assessing the probability of passing a TEL
include state characteristics, Z, and federal transfers.
Federal Transfers
The federal intergovernmental transfers a state receives, as noted earlier, is
not an exogenous outcome unrelated to state expenditures. The allocation of
federal intergovernmental transfers depends not only on state socioeconomic
characteristics, but also on the fiscal conditions and arrangements within the state.
Shedbegian (1999) finds that federal transfers are endogenous and develops an
instrument to use for the variable. His approach will be followed here.
The lagged unemployment rate and the lagged percent of families living in
poverty are used as instruments. Both of these variables are expected to be
positively related to federal intergovernmental transfers. Also, included are state
and local expenditures since federal transfers are often directly linked to these
expenditures in the form of matching funds. Finally, the states personal income is
inversely related to the federal intergovernmental transfer decision and thus, a
strong determinant of the level of transfers.
Data Sources
The data for this study is from the following sources: Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations’ Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, which
contains information on state tax rates, tax limitations on rates and bases and state
tax base measures. State Government Finances (U.S. Bureau of Census) which has
detailed expenditure and revenue data for each state. The U.S. Statistical Abstract
which includes information on state expenditures and revenue, as well as
5

States with historical provisions for direct legislation include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington.
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individual state socioeconomic characteristics. The Bureau of Economic Analysis
which has data on Gross State Product and personal income.

54

The following tables provide summary statistics on the variables and a list of
the variables used in the state budget model.
Table 4.2 Summary Statistics
Variable

OBS.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

784

1526.206

367.482

861.546

3143.381

784

1.302157

0.352368

0.667424

2.702049

784

0.353736

0.09902

0.161212

0.953961

784

143.7829

133.1194

0

1273.527

784

1.337972

0.388922

0.578907

3.0117

784

0.014033

0.020351

0.000106

0.186305

784

1.05381

0.330143

0.427975

2.474928

Sales Tax Base

784

0.459078

0.217753

0

1.260365

Sales Tax Rate

784

0.040961

0.016248

0

0.08

TEL

784

0.327806

0.469713

0

1

784

10351.66

1811.305

6822

17103

784

12674.63

2548.25

8190.882

26239.29

Population

784

4822434

5040352

413000

3.09E+07

Percent Under 18

784

0.274143

0.027372

0.139121

0.374922

784

0.120235

0.021332

0.071513

0.201057

784

163.385

227.1632

4.253

1049.9

735

0.009672

0.012962

-0.04421

0.081908

784

13.73074

4.281558

2.9

27.2

Per Capita
Expenditures
Per Capita
Revenue
Per Capita
Federal Transfers
Per Capita
Borrowing
Per Capita Local
Expenditures
Per Capita Local
Transfers
Per Capita Other
Revenue

Per Capita
Private Income
Per Capita
Private GSP

Percent 65 and
Over
Population
Density
Population
Growth
Poverty Rate
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Variable

OBS.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

784

0.076254

0.0182

0.027863

0.164737

784

6.669031

2.1477

2.2

18

Border Base

768

0.425975

0.110706

0

0.743

Border Rate

768

0.041176

0.011356

0

0.062

Direct

784

0.450255

0.497837

0

1

Number of
Legislators

784

151.4324

59.28678
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424

Upper Distance

768

0.188501

0.134543

0

0.5

Lower Distance

768

0.176325

0.127472

0

0.5

Governor

784

0.605867

0.488976

0

1

CPI

784

1.07

0.243517

0.63

1.45

Area

784

60528.67

46543.64

1045

261914.3

Taxation of
Personal Income
Unemployment
Rate
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Table 4.3 Variable Description and Source
Variable

Description

Source

Per Capita Expenditures

Total state expenditures divided by
total state population

Census of Government Finances

Per Capita Revenue

Per capita own source revenues ($000) Census of Government Finances

Per Capita Federal Transfers

Per capita federal intergovernmental
transfers ($000)

Per Capita Borrowing

Per capita long-term debt issued during
the year plus change in short-term debt Census of Government Finances
for the year

Per Capita Local Expenditure

Per capita local expenditures ($000)

Census of Government Finances

Per Capita Local Transfers

Per capita local transfers ($000)

Census of Government Finances

Per Capita Other Revenue

Per capita own source revenue less
sales tax revenue ($000)

Census of Government Finances

Sales Tax Base

The sales tax revenue divided by the
sales tax rate, this amount is then
divided by private GSP

ACIR: SFFF, BEA

Sales Tax Rate

General sales tax rate

ACIR: SFFF

TEL

1 if there is a Statutory or
Constitutional expenditure and/or
ACIR: SFFF
revenue growth limitation, 0 otherwise

Per Capita Private Income

Per capita total personal income less
income from government

BEA

Per Capita Private GSP

Per capita total Gross State Product
(GSP) less government component of
GSP

BEA

Population

US Census population estimates
rounded to nearest thousand

US Census Bureau

Percent Under 18

Percent of people in state less than 18
US Census Bureau
years old

Percent 65 and Over

Percent of people in state 65 and older US Census Bureau

Population Density

State population divided by area

Population Growth

One year percent change in population US Census Bureau

Poverty Rate

US Census estimated poverty rates,
substituting 1969 for 1971 rate and
1975 for 1977 rate.

US Census Bureau

Taxation of Personal Income

Total revenue less sales tax revenue
divided by private personal income

US Census Bureau
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Census of Government Finances

US Census Bureau

Variable

Description

Source

Unemployment Rate

State unemployment rates

BLS

Border Base

Population weighted average of
bordering states sales tax rate

ACIR: SFFF

Border Rate

Population weighted average of
bordering states sales tax base

ACIR: SFFF

Direct

States with "long standing" direct
legislation provisions

Number of Legislators

Number of elected state legislators

Upper Distance
Lower Distance

Council of State Government

Absolute value of the percent of
Council of State Government
democrats in the upper chamber minus
0.5
Absolute value of the percent of
democrats in the lower chamber minus Council of State Government
0.5

Governor

1 if governor is a democrat, 0 otherwise Council of State Government

CPI

BLS reported CPI-U

US BLS

Area

State's square miles

US Census Geography
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Chapter 5: Estimation Results
This chapter presents the results from estimating the state finance system of
equations as developed in Chapter 4. Several different specifications and variations
of the model will be presented. In total there are eight different specifications all of
which are variations upon the model described in Chapter 4. The different
specifications range from a simple ordinary least squares regression of the
expenditures equation to the final three stage least squares fixed effects
econometric model that includes both state and time effects. Table 5.1 at the end of
this chapter briefly summarizes the different three stage least squares specifications
and Table 5.2 presents the estimation results. The different specifications reported
do not constitute a specification search, but rather will provide insight into
relationships within the model, highlight the importance of applying the
appropriate specification to the state finance system, and demonstrate the
robustness of the final results.
The specifications range from an ordinary least squares estimation of an
augmented expenditure equation to the three stage least squares fixed effects
estimation of the state budget model. The ordinary least squares estimations are
designed to provide insight into the basic relationships between the variables and
how changes in the specifications effect these relationships. The ordinary least
squares estimations ignore the endogeneity inherent in some of the variables.
Several specifications are designed to provide an insight into how a specific group
of variables in the equation impact the outcome of the estimation. These variable
groups include: political economy variables, local economy variables, border effect
variables state indicator variables, and time indicator variables. The final
specification incorporates variables and procedures needed for a theoretically and
econometrically sound estimation of the state budget model.
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The results are analyzed according to the estimation approach, ordinary least
squares or three stage least squares, and the effects of including various sets of
variables into the model. Our primary interest is on how sensitive is the coefficient
on the sales tax base in the expenditure equation to different specifications.
The results of the specification estimations report the estimated coefficient,
t-statistic, and the p-statistic. The p-statistic is interpreted as the minimum
confidence level that the null hypothesis for statistical significance would be
rejected. Where applicable an R-square statistic and F-statistic are reported. For the
three stage least squares estimation only a “quasi” R-square statistic along with a
chi-square statistic are reported.
It should be stated that the estimation of the structural equations using three
stage least squares is to discover the parameter values and not to develop
projections of the dependent variable. Thus, the “quasi” R-squared statistic
reported is not an overly important, meaningful statistic when evaluating the
structural model estimation.
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
The ordinary least squares estimates (see Appendix A) were performed to
provide some insight into the relationships between the variables and to assist in
determining the robustness of the final specifications estimation. It is abundantly
clear from these OLS estimates that the use of the state and time fixed effects are
necessary to accurately portray the relationships established in the state finance
model.
The results of the OLS specifications do not control for the endogeneity
inherent in the state finance model. Because the structural equations represent a
series of simultaneous interdependent equations ordinary least squares estimates
will tend to exhibit biased and inconsistent parameter estimates.
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These OLS specifications were primarily instructive regarding the need to
control for fixed effects in the model. Previous work on state panel data indicated
the need to develop state specific effects, but little information was available
regarding the use of time effects in a state finance model. The OLS estimates
suggest the tax base and expenditures are positively and significantly related.
These, results held for all of the estimations and seem robust to different
specifications. Whether this relationship holds once you control for endogeneity
will be investigated next.
Three Stage Least Squares Estimation
Specification Test for Endogeneity of Tax Base Size
Before estimating the expenditure equation using the three stage least
squares procedure, the hypothesized endogeneity of the tax base size should be
confirmed. Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) suggest the Durbin-Wu-Hausman
(DWH) test for endogeneity. The augmented regression test is formed by including
the residual of the endogenous right-hand-side variable as a function of all
exogenous variables in a regression of the original equation. In this case, the
residual of the instrumented tax base variable will be included in the estimation of
the expenditure equation. The test is of the following form where the simultaneous
equations are
Z = a 0 + a 1 x1 + a 2 x 2 + e 1
Y = b 0 + b1 Z + b 2 x3 + e 2

You first perform the regression,
Z = f 0 + f1 x1 + f 2 x 2 + f 3 x3 + e 3

then get the residual from this regression and perform the following
augmented regression
Y = d 0 + d 1Z + d 2 x3 + d 3residual + e 4
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if d3 is statistically significant, then the ordinary least squares estimate
would not be consistent.
For the expenditure equation, the critical value of the F-statistic
(1,593) at the 95 percent confidence level is 3.84. The F-statistic on the residual is
15.91, thus we reject the hypothesis of no endogeneity of the tax base.
Identification of the System
The state finance system contains five endogenous variables. These
variables must be uniquely identified by instrumental variables in the structural
equation within which they are endogenous. Two of these endogenous variables,
tax and expenditure limits (TELs) and federal intergovernmental transfers, are
instrumented as per previous work documented in Shedbagian (1999), Skidmore
(1998), and Rueben (1995). The variables that identify TELS and federal transfers
are direct legislation; and lagged unemployment and lagged poverty rates,
respectively.
Thus before presenting the final specification, the per capita expenditures,
sales tax base, and sales tax rate need to be explicitly examined in order to
determine if they are appropriately identified in each of the equations for which
they appear as an endogenous determinant. If these endogenous variables are not
fully identified, then the robustness of the results of the estimation could be
brought into question. It certainly would weaken the conclusions that could be
drawn from this estimation.
In order to test whether each variable is uniquely identified, two stage least
squares will be utilized. Consider the following system where Y1 and Y2 occur
simultaneously:
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Y1 = X1*b1 + X2*b2 + X3*b3 + Y2*b4 + u1
Y2 = X3*a1 + x4*a2 + x5*a3 + Y1*a4 + u2
To do 2SLS we need X1, X2 and X3 to be uncorrelated with u2, and X4 and
X5 to be uncorrelated with u1. In other words, if we include X1 and X2 in the
equation for Y2 (with Y1) their coefficients need to be zero if they are to be used
as instruments. This leads to the test: do 2SLS on the system, but include X1 in
the equation for Y2 and if it is significant, it fails the test.
The first test is on the tax base variable in the expenditure structural
equation. There are three variables that should be good instruments for the tax
base. They are the number of elected legislators, the previous years change in
personal income, and the previous years change in revenue. While the number of
legislators influences policy regarding tax base and rate choices, there is no
compelling argument that the number will influence per capita expenditures. When
the number of legislators was included in the two stage least square estimation on
expenditures its t-statistics was 0.534 and it passes the test and is a suitable
instrument.
The two variables accounting for a states income and revenue volatility, the
previous years change in personal income and the previous years change in
revenue, are factors which may influence a state’s desire for broader bases, but
should have no bearing on the state’s expenditures. When these variables were
inserted individually into the expenditure equation their respective t-statistics were,
0.414 and –0.311. Thus, these variables make for suitable instruments as well.
Moreover, it can be concluded that the tax base is identified in the expenditure
structural equation.
The next equation, the sales tax base, contains two endogenous variables, tax
rates and expenditures. These variables must be tested for identification. There are
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three variables that should uniquely define expenditures in the tax base equation;
state unemployment rates, and the political economy variables upper and lower
distance. State unemployment rates, an important business cycle variable, should
have little impact on a state’s choice for its sales tax base. When the
unemployment rate was inserted into the tax base equation its t-statistic was –1.350
and it passes the test, therefore, it is a good instrument.
The two political economy variables are designed to gauge incumbency
strength of a political party that effect appropriations by the legislature, therefore,
base choices should not be influenced by these variables on theoretical grounds.
Nonetheless, each variable was tested and found to be statistically insignificant
with t-statistics of 0.140 for upper distance and 0.752 for lower distance. It can be
concluded that per capita expenditures are uniquely identified.
The next variable in the tax base equation that must be identified is the sales
tax rate. Two variables, the weighted average of the bordering states’ tax rates, and
the forecasted change in the state’s revenue, should impact state tax rate decisions,
but not tax base decisions. The test confirmed that both would be good instruments
with respective t-statistics of, 0.479 and

-.403. Therefore, the sales tax rate is

uniquely identified in the sales tax base equation.
The final tests are on the endogenous per capita expenditures variable and
the sales tax base variable in the sales tax rate equation. There are three variables
that should uniquely define expenditures in the tax rate equation; state borrowing,
local expenditures, and local transfers. State borrowing should have no impact on a
state’s choice for its sales tax rate. When borrowing was inserted into the tax rate
equation its t-statistic was –1.453 and it is a good instrument.
The two local economy variables are designed to measure the degree of
centralization of government and control for local government involvement.
Therefore, neither variable should impact state tax rates. This was confirmed by
64

the tests where each variable was found to be statistically insignificant with tstatistics of –1.200 for local state transfers and 1.158 for local expenditures. It can
be concluded that per capita expenditures are uniquely identified.
The next variable in the tax rate equation that must be identified is the sales
tax base. Two variables, the weighted average of bordering states’ tax bases and
the number of state elected legislators, should impact state tax base decisions, but
not tax rate decisions. The test confirmed that the border base variable is a good
instrument with a t-statistics of 1.674. The number of legislators, however, was
statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance, t = 1.970. Therefore,
the sales tax base is identified by the border base variable, but the number of
legislators variables does not pass the test.
This finding on the number of legislators suggest that it should be included
as a determinant of tax rates. The final specification was changed to include this
variable.
Another candidate for a tax base instrument are the time indicator variables.
A discussion of Specification IV develops the justification for including the time
effects in the expenditure and tax base structural equations, but no compelling
reason could be established for their presence in the tax rate equation. Thus, an
effort to determine if the tax base is identified by the time effects would also
confirm that they do not belong in the tax rate equation.
In order to test whether these variables are significant to the tax rate
equation an F-test is preformed. The F-test indirectly employs the Wald test
statistic (Greene, 1993) where Rb=r denotes the set of q linear hypotheses to be
tested jointly. Let the estimated coefficient vector be b and the estimated variancecovariance matrix be V. Then the Wald statistic is given by
W = (Rb-r)¢(RVR)¢-1(Rb-r)
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And the F statistic computed with q numerator degrees of freedom and d
denominator degrees of freedom is given by
F= (1/q)W
The test for the time effects in the tax rate equation is tested against the
critical value, F(13, 593) = 1.73. The generated F statistic is 0.503, therefore, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the time variables do not effect tax rates. The
findings from this test and the test on the border base variable results in the
conclusion that the sales tax base is identified in the tax rate equation.
This inquiry into the identification of the state finance system has found that
the endogenous variables are identified, thus confirming the robustness of the
results from the estimation of the system.

Three Stage Least Squares Estimation
Specification I – V, reported at the end of this chapter, are estimated using
the three stage least squares estimation procedure. The estimation procedure
controls for endogeneity in the state finance model. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
for endogeneity confirmed the hypothesized endogenous relationship between the
tax base and expenditures and the need for controlling for endogeneity in
estimating their relationship. Strong theoretical evidence has been presented to
support the endogeneity of the other endogenous variables in the model.
In the OLS specifications the fixed effects problem created by the use of
pooled state data was addressed. It showed the least squares procedures of
assuming a constant intercept across states and time was incorrect. The
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introduction of state and time indicator variables removes this restriction on the
model. An objection to using state and time indicators is that their use implies that
there is important missing information. Because this essay is focused on
determining the impact tax base choices have on expenditures and not the
development of a comprehensive description of all matters effecting state fiscal
outcomes across time, the fixed effects indicator variable approach is appropriate
in the 3SLS specifications.
Specification I begins the process of exploring the importance of a set of
variables that include the political economy, local economy and border effect
variables. The omission of these variables allows us to explore the sensitivity of
the model specification to the exclusion of these variables while controlling for
endogeneity and fixed effects. Specification I omits all three sets of variables.
Omitting these three sets of variables from the model seems to create an
upward bias in the estimated equations for all three variables of interest. The
response of expenditures to changes in the tax base size is quite elastic with the
coefficient being 1.293. The tax rate variable in the tax base equation is not
statistically significant. The tax rate equation finds the sign and significance of the
tax base coefficient is as expected.
Specification II returns to the estimation the local economy variables: local
expenditures, and state transfers to the local governments. There does not appear to
be any significant effect from the inclusion of these variables on the estimation
results. In fact, both variables are statistically insignificant in the expenditure
equation.
Specification III returns the border effects, border base and border rate, to
the estimated model. These variables enter the tax base and tax rate equations,
respectively. The border base variable is not statistically significant, but the border
rate variable is significant and of the expected sign, positive.
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The coefficient on tax base in the expenditure equation is now 2.742
suggesting a very elastic response to an increase in the size of the tax base by
expenditures. The coefficient on the tax rate in the tax base equation is now
negative and significant at the 10 percent level of confidence. Also, the coefficient
on the tax base variable in the tax rate equation remains statistically significant and
of the proper sign. It, therefore, can be concluded that border effects are important
determinants in the state budget model.
Before including the political economy variables, Specification IV examines
the sensitivity of the model to the inclusion of the time effects indicator variables
in the tax rate equation. There was no compelling reason to expect time effects to
influence tax rate choices, and this specification confirms that hypothesis.
Including time effects into the estimation would imply there are yearly differences
that influence the dependent variables in the structural equations. For example, this
model does not contain changes in federal policy that may effect state expenditure
decisions and outcomes. An increase in unfunded mandates from the federal
government could have just such an effect. Likewise, changes in the nation’s
economic growth could effect tax bases in the states. State unemployment is
included in the model to proxy business cycle fluctuations, but changes in the
nations wealth or resources may not be fully proxied with the unemployment
variable. Because this model does not attempt to model federal economic and
political influences on state fiscal outcomes, time effects are included in the model.
Thus far, time effects can be justified in the expenditure and tax base
equations, but it is more difficult to justify there presence in the tax rate equation.
As this specifications results and that of specification V show, including time
effects into the tax rate equation has implications on the interpretation of the effect
the tax base has on tax rates.
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There are no significant impacts to including time effects in the tax rate
equation with respect to the expenditure and tax base structural equations. This is
not true, however, for the tax rate equation.
In the tax rate equation significant changes occur when time effects are
included. The coefficient on the tax base is no longer statistically significant as it
has been throughout the estimations of the model. This suggest that the time effects
are irrelevant to the determination of the tax rate. If that is so, then the inclusion of
time effects will increase the variance of the coefficient. The standard error does
indeed increase when the time effects are included in the sales tax rate equation6.
From a theoretical standpoint, time effects should, as argued above, be included in
the expenditure and base equation, but not in the tax rate equation. This
specification confirms time effects are inappropriate. For these reasons the final
specification will include time effects in the expenditure and tax base equations,
but not in the tax rate equation.
Specification V: Final Results
This specification includes fixed state and time effects in the expenditure
and tax base equations and state only fixed effects in the tax rate equation. Before
discussing the results of the estimation as individual equations, the importance of
the political economy variables needs to be addressed.
In Specification III the complete model was estimated except for the
political economy variables. Specification V now returns those variables to the
model. A comparison of these two specifications highlights the importance of
political economy variables to the model. Most notably, in the expenditure
equation the coefficient on the tax base is 2.74 compared with 0.364 in the
6

The standard error on the tax base coefficient in the tax rate equation is .2012 when time effects are included into all three
equations and .1345 when the time effects are removed from the tax rate equation, but left in the other two equations. Test on
identification reinforce the inappropriateness of time effects in the tax rate equation.
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properly specified estimation. Also in the expenditure equation, federal transfers
and the unemployment rate are not statistically significant when these variables are
omitted. Thus, omission of the political economy variables creates an omitted
variable bias in the coefficient estimations.
Additionally, the identification test revealed that the number of legislators
variable should be included in the tax rate equation. Inclusion of this variable only
had modest impacts on other variables in the system.
The results of this estimation supports the primary hypothesis, does the size
of the base taxed matter with respect to state spending. In addition to the
hypothesis on tax base size and expenditures being supported by the empirical
evidence, the more fundamental hypotheses that broad tax bases lead to lower tax
rates and conversely, higher tax rates lead to narrower tax bases are also supported.
What follows is an equation by equation analysis of the empirical results.
Expenditure Equation
Our results show that the size of a tax base significantly effects state
spending. Since the model was estimated using a log-linear functional form, the
coefficients of the estimations represent percentage changes.
The size of the tax base has a positive and statistically significant impact on
expenditures, as noted above. Comparing results from the alternative specification
indicates this result is robust to inclusion of fixed effects. The magnitude of the
coefficient is 0.37 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level of confidence.
This parameter estimate implies a 10 percent increase in the tax base size will
increase per capita expenditures by 3.64 percent.
As expected per capita federal transfers positively impact state expenditures.
The process of determining many federal transfers into the state require spending
by the state, matching funds. The matches are typically determined by the state’s
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per capita income and the ranking of the state relative to other states. When the
model is run without state fixed effects the transfers are statistically significant.
Because a states relative standing with the other states matters and this standing is
a function of both personal income and population, then the fixed effects approach
may not be appropriate for measuring the impact of state transfers on state
spending without including time indicator variables. When the system is run with
the time variables per capita federal transfers is positive and statistically
significant.
TELs on the other hand, do not influence expenditures. Before accounting
for the endogeneity inherent in TELs, earlier ordinary least squares specifications
found they were statistically significant and positive.
Private per capita personal income is significant at the 5.7 percent level of
confidence and is negative. When the model is run with total personal income,
private personal income plus government personal income, the sign is reversed.
Correcting for the endogeneity between personal income and expenditures by
removing personal income accruing to government workers changes the influence
personal income has on expenditures. Therefore, state per capita spending is lower
for high, private personal income states, all else equal.
Several variables, all statistically significant, have interesting interpretations,
as well. The unemployment rate, a business cycle proxy, is significant and positive
implying expenditures are responsive to changes in the business cycle. State
borrowing is also significant and positive indicating that higher borrowing per
capita is accompanied by higher expenditures per capita.
Finally, the two political economy variables, upper distance and lower
distance, are statistically significant at the 1 percent and 10 percent level of
confidence, respectively. Party incumbency strength in the lower chamber relates
to higher state expenditures, while party incumbency strength in the upper chamber
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leads to lower expenditures. This relationship may make sense within the context
of where spending is originated and amended. The lower chamber, typically,
originates all revenue and appropriation bills and the upper chamber will amend
those bills. Before a final spending measure is passed, usually a conference
committee involving both chambers is required to pass the appropriation bill.
Thus, all else equal, party power in the lower chamber will tend to pass
higher spending legislation, but that spending is not passed on when party
incumbency power exist in the upper chamber. Political economy outcomes have
not been the focus of this study and these variables may suffer from some omitted
variable bias. For example, it may matter where whether the same party has power
in both chambers and which party has an overall majority.
Sales Tax Base Equation
As expected, the sales tax base and rate have an inverse relationship. The
coefficient on the sales tax rate, -0.594, is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level of confidence. This parameter estimate implies a 10 percent rise in the tax
rate would reduce the sales tax base by 5.94 percent, a relatively inelastic response.
The parameter estimate is capturing two effects from base size changes, a
political economy change to the base size and a change in the demand for goods
and services in the base. The consumer demand effect arises from a tax rate
increase and thus a price increase for goods in the base. This price increase will
lead to a decrease in consumption of goods in the base, all else equal. The political
economy effect is the choice to limit or reduce the base and increase the rate.
Because, the state finance model does not include a model of consumer
demand it is not possible to separate these two effects. Since both effects on the
base are negatively correlated with a rise in the tax rate, it is expected that the
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political economy response to changes in the tax rate is even more inelastic than
estimated in this study.
Also, of importance to the tax base is the rate of taxation of personal income
from other tax sources. This “effective tax rate” for other revenue is inversely
related to the sales tax base. Thus, higher rates of taxation on personal income
reduces the sales tax base. In a related vein, higher per capita other revenue is
statistically significant and positive. This implies that a greater reliance on other
revenue sources, all else equal, will leave a broader base available for sales
taxation, but the reduction in income from the higher “effective tax rate” narrows
the sales tax base.
Finally, the political economy variable on the number of elected state
legislators is statistically significant and positive at the 1 percent level of
confidence. The positive coefficient on the number of legislators implies that the
probability of a state using a broad base sales tax increases with the number of
elected legislators.
Sales Tax Rate Equation
As with the sales tax base equation, the sales base and rate retain their
inverse relationship. The coefficient on the tax base, -0.593, is statistically
significant at the 1 percent level of confidence. This estimate implies a 10 percent
increase in the size of the tax base would reduce the sales tax rate by 5.93 percent.
Because there are no consumption effects, this is purely a political economy
response to the change in the base size. A t-test to determine if the coefficient is
statistically the same as negative one (-1) generated a t-statistic of 2.70 and the null
hypothesis was rejected. Thus, the response can not be characterized as a revenue
neutral response.
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The number of legislators is significant at the 10 percent level of confidence
and is positive. Just as with the tax base, states with a large number of legislators
will have both broader bases and higher tax rates, all else equal.
In the tax base equation, per capita expenditures where statistically
insignificant, but they are significant and positively related to tax rates. The
taxation of personal income is significant and negative and as with the sales tax
base implies a higher “effective tax rate” on other income, not consumed by the
sales tax, will reduce the rate applied to the sales tax base.
Also of interest are the variables pertaining to revenue forecast and
bordering states tax rates. The coefficient on the change in forecasted revenues,
measured as the change in revenues from the previous to the current year, is
positive and significant at the 10 percent level of confidence. Therefore, the
increase in forecasted revenue needs will increase the chances of there being a
sales tax rate increase.
The weighted average border tax rates is positive and significant at the 1
percent level of confidence. This strongly implies the sales tax rates imposed by
border states are considered, either directly or indirectly, when a state sets its sales
tax rate and is consistent with findings by Fox (1986).
Chapter 6 will present the implications and limitations of these empirical
findings and discuss future research possibilities.
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Table 5.1: Three Stage Least Squares Specifications

Specification

Description

I

Fixed effects estimation without political economy, local
economy, or border effect variables

II

Same as specification I with local economy variables included

III

Same as specification II with border effects included

IV

Complete model estimated with time effects included in the
tax rate equation

V

Final specification of the complete state finance model
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Table 5.2 Three Stage Least Square Specification Results I -V
3SLS Estimations: Per Capita Expenditures
Specification
I
Coeff.
t-stat

p-stat

Coeff.

II
t-stat

p-stat

Sales Tax Base*

1.293

2.223

0.026

1.600

2.312

0.021

Per Capita Federal Transfers*

0.756

1.908

0.056

0.441

0.861

0.389

III
t-stat

p-stat

Coeff.

IV
t-stat

p-stat

Coeff.

V
t-stat

p-stat

2.742

5.187

0.000

0.370

2.644

0.008

0.364

2.602

0.009

-0.323

-1.023

0.306

0.522

3.432

0.001

0.505

3.321

0.001

0.061

0.726

0.468

0.066

0.790

0.431

Coeff.

TEL*
Per Capita Private Income

-0.450

-1.225

0.221

-0.663

-1.549

0.121

-1.187

-3.068

0.002

-0.275

-1.904

0.057

-0.294

-2.037

0.042

Unemployment Rate

0.016

0.641

0.522

0.016

0.662

0.508

0.012

0.821

0.412

0.032

2.388

0.017

0.032

2.417

0.016

0.008

0.529

0.597

0.020

1.710

0.087

0.003

0.608

0.543

0.004

0.724

0.484

Per Capita Local Transfers
Per Capita Local Expenditures
Per Capita Borrowing

0.003

1.398

0.162
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0.068

0.594

0.553

0.197

1.748

0.080

0.169

3.399

0.001

0.176

3.529

0.000

0.003

1.636

0.102

0.003

1.716

0.086

0.003

3.060

0.002

0.003

3.035

0.002

-0.003

-3.353

0.001

-0.003

-3.541

0.000
0.081

Upper Distance
Lower Distance

0.002

1.562

0.118

0.002

1.742

Governor

-0.005

-0.935

0.350

-0.005

-0.873

0.383

0.034

0.344

4.162

0.000

0.353

4.280

0.000

Per Capita Private GSP

0.281

2.001

Percent under 18

-0.110

Percent 65 and over

0.114

Population Density

0.045

0.330

2.239

0.025

0.411

2.115

-1.026

0.305

-0.123

-1.093

0.274

-0.184

-1.122

0.262

-0.047

-0.870

0.384

-0.046

-0.867

0.386

0.615

0.538

0.034

0.154

0.877

-0.080

-0.318

0.750

0.070

0.826

0.409

0.064

0.763

0.445

0.323

0.894

0.371

0.026

0.053

0.958

-0.699

-1.967

0.049

0.234

1.654

0.098

0.219

1.547

0.122

Population Growth

-0.001

-0.422

0.673

-0.001

-0.352

0.725

-0.001

-0.434

0.664

0.000

0.483

0.629

0.000

0.531

0.596

Poverty Rate

0.021

0.610

0.542

0.022

0.629

0.530

0.026

0.472

0.637

-0.004

-0.160

0.873

-0.004

-0.169

0.866

constant

9.208

2.509

0.012

(dropped)

(dropped)

6.379

5.553

0.000

(dropped)

state indicators

output omitted

output omitted

output omitted

output omitted

output omitted

year indicators

output omitted

output omitted

output omitted

output omitted

output omitted

quasi R-squared

0.762

Chi-square 3.65E+03
*endogenous

0.690
0.000

3.54E+06

0.141
0.000

1.60E+03

0.956
0.000

1.50E+04

0.957
0.000

1.54E+07

0.000

3SLS Estimations: Sales Tax Base
Specification
Coeff.

I
t-stat

p-stat

Coeff.

II
t-stat

p-stat

Coeff.

III
t-stat

p-stat

Coeff.

IV
t-stat

p-stat

Coeff.

V
t-stat

p-stat

Sales Tax Rate*

-0.028

-0.050

0.960

-0.307

-0.876

0.381

-0.37573

-1.912

0.056

-0.503

-3.201

0.001

-0.594

-3.917

0.000

Taxation of Personal Income

-0.015

-0.155

0.877

-0.062

-0.949

0.343

-0.06682

-1.734

0.083

-0.147

-3.369

0.001

-0.158

-3.710

0.000

Per Capita Expenditures*

0.321

0.813

0.416

0.153

0.758

0.449

0.10132

0.520

0.603

0.025

0.169

0.866

-0.006

-0.041

0.967

Per Capita Private Income

0.407

1.138

0.255

0.280

1.180

0.238

0.136502

0.642

0.521

0.091

0.555

0.579

0.159

0.998

0.319

Per Capita Other Revenue

0.027

0.213

0.831

0.079

0.883

0.377

0.061981

1.212

0.226

0.159

1.902

0.057

0.197

2.405

0.016

0.031862

1.243

0.214

0.078

1.301

0.193

0.049

0.846

0.398

Border Base
Change in Income (t-2)

0.000

-0.199

0.843

0.000

0.198

0.843

0.000793

1.521

0.128

0.000

-0.120

0.905

0.000

-0.083

0.934

Change in Revenue (t-2)

0.000

-0.284

0.776

0.000

-0.424

0.672

-9.6E-05

-0.266

0.791

0.000

-0.040

0.968

0.000

-0.049

0.961

0.362

3.587

0.000

0.372

3.690

0.000
0.003

Number of Legislators
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Per Capita Private GSP

-0.147

-0.886

0.375

-0.219

-1.570

0.117

-0.19409

-1.919

0.055

-0.229

-2.220

0.026

-0.304

-2.998

Percent under 18

0.072

0.602

0.547

0.035

0.358

0.720

0.02149

0.249

0.804

0.015

0.193

0.847

0.004

0.052

0.958

Percent 65 and over

0.007

0.022

0.983

-0.131

-0.609

0.543

-0.21394

-1.250

0.211

-0.280

-2.089

0.037

-0.309

-2.379

0.017

Population Density

0.158

0.867

0.386

0.245

1.877

0.061

0.248662

2.281

0.023

0.298

3.037

0.002

0.334

3.458

0.001

Population Growth

0.001

0.381

0.704

0.001

0.890

0.373

0.001475

1.246

0.213

0.002

1.480

0.139

0.002

1.519

0.129

-0.017

-0.568

0.570

-0.017

-0.630

0.529

-0.00988

-0.359

0.72

-0.003

-0.124

0.902

-0.009

-0.373

0.709

-4.902

-2.667

0.008

(dropped)

(dropped)

(dropped)

Poverty Rate
constant

(dropped)

state indicators

output omitted

output omitted

output omitted

output omitted

output omitted

year indicators

output omitted

output omitted

output omitted

output omitted

output omitted

Adjusted or quasi R-squared

0.999

Chi-square 2.52E+06
*endogenous

0.999
0.000

3.54E+06

0.999
0.000

2.86E+06

0.999
0.000

3.83E+06

0.999
0.000

3.83E+06

0.000

3SLS Estimations: Sales Tax Rate
Specification
Coeff.

I
t-stat

p-stat

Coeff.

II
t-stat

p-stat

Coeff.

III
t-stat

p-stat

Coeff.

IV
t-stat

p-stat

Coeff.

V
t-stat

p-stat

Sales Tax Base*

-4.734

0.000

-0.748

-4.730

0.000

-0.434

-2.734

0.006

-0.069

-0.343

0.731

-0.593

-3.947

0.000

0.241

1.692

0.091

-0.784

Number of Legislators
Per Capita Expenditures*

0.303

2.508

0.012

0.280

2.544

0.011

0.324

3.107

0.002

0.295

5.749

0.000

TEL*
Border Rate

0.360

1.447

0.148

0.369

3.338

0.001

-0.210

-1.476

0.140

-0.144

-1.369

0.171

0.216

2.682

0.007

0.305

5.367

0.000
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Change Total Revenue (t-1)

0.002

1.367

0.171

0.002

1.319

0.187

0.003

1.940

0.052

0.004

1.883

0.060

0.003

1.769

0.077

Taxation of Personal Income

-0.142

-4.321

0.000

-0.148

-4.558

0.000

-0.121

-3.767

0.000

-0.074

-1.229

0.219

-0.122

-3.622

0.000

Per Capita Private Income

0.454

3.685

0.000

0.442

3.640

0.000

0.292

2.453

0.014

-0.133

-0.626

0.531

0.421

3.147

0.002

Per Capita Other Revenue

0.067

0.892

0.372

0.081

1.148

0.251

-0.029

-0.409

0.683

-0.330

-2.349

0.019

-0.027

-0.356

0.722

Per Capita Private GSP

-0.659

-7.621

0.000

-0.657

-7.708

0.000

-0.502

-5.847

0.000

-0.400

-2.679

0.007

-0.597

-5.277

0.000

Percent under 18

-0.068

-0.784

0.433

-0.069

-0.813

0.416

-0.128

-1.556

0.120

-0.165

-1.691

0.091

-0.103

-1.150

0.250

Percent 65 and over

-0.217

-2.346

0.019

-0.200

-2.235

0.025

-0.192

-2.231

0.026

-0.382

-2.559

0.011

-0.276

-3.049

0.002

Population Density

0.427

4.879

0.000

0.433

5.028

0.000

0.301

3.462

0.001

0.129

1.036

0.300

0.307

3.327

0.001

Population Growth

0.002

1.446

0.148

0.002

1.445

0.149

0.002

1.631

0.103

0.003

1.822

0.068

0.002

1.682

0.093

Poverty Rate

-0.050

-1.814

0.070

-0.049

-1.824

0.068

-0.028

-1.050

0.294

0.056

1.348

0.178

0.012

0.350

0.726

-6.819

-5.393

0.000

-6.546

-5.459

0.000

-5.274

-4.613

0.000

-7.455

-5.110

0.000

constant
state indicators

output omitted

output omitted

output omitted

output omitted

year indicators
Adjusted or quasi R-squared 0.999
Chi-square 1.65E+06
*endogenous

output omitted

output omitted
0.000

0.999
1.67E+06

0.000

0.999
1.80E+06

0.000

0.999
3.02E+06

0.000

0.999
1.63E+06

0.000

Chapter 6: Conclusions
This study empirically tested the relationship between the tax base and
government expenditures. Additionally, this study examined the relationship
between the tax base and tax rate and determinants influencing those variables.
The purpose of the study was to move the discussion of policy away from
purely normative assertions on government objectives and place the focus on a
positive analysis of how public institutions actually function. To execute this
analysis, an empirical model of a state’s finances was developed based on prior
work examining state fiscal relationships.
The econometric model draws from literature on the demand for government
goods and services, optimal tax models, and the fundamental revenue and
accounting equilibrium conditions. The model consisted of five structural
equations and two equilibrium identities. The seven equations were designed to
describe the revenue and expenditure aspects of a state’s finances. Specifically, this
model allows one to test whether government spending may be constrained by
restrictions on the tax base made available to the taxing authority. Therefore, the
emphasis was on the tax base and its relationship with government expenditures.
The equations in the model were constructed to assure the influence the size of the
tax base has on expenditures could be measured.
Optimal tax theory assumes a rather innocuous relationship between the tax
base and government spending, while public choice theory, as developed by
Buchanan and others, assumes the two can be related. Thus, the empirical model
was developed to reconcile these different views on the relationship between the
tax base and expenditures. The empirical model is developed as a fixed effects
model. The final specification included state and time fixed effects.
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Since the model represents a system of equations, the use of ordinary least
squares estimation was inappropriate. Therefore, the state finance system of
equations was estimated using three stage least squares. Consistent with other
empirical work on state fiscal relationships, a log-linear functional form was
assumed. The model was estimated using data from forty-eight states for the
sixteen year period from 1977 to 1992.
Within the expenditure equation, the coefficient on the tax base is positive
and is statistically significant in the various fixed effects three stage least squares
specifications estimated. The estimated response of expenditures to changes in the
tax base size is relatively inelastic. Nonetheless, this result implies that it is
erroneous to treat the broadening of a tax base as unrelated to state expenditure
outcomes. This study has shown it can no longer be appropriate to assume that
government outcomes are analogous to an equi-revenue provider of goods and
services. The results imply that it is important to not only consider the efficiency
implications from base broadening, but also the ability of this base increase to fuel
higher government spending.
As stated at the beginning of this study, there exist a divergence of views in
assigning an objective function to government. At one end of the continuum there
is the benevolent equi-revenue provider, at the other the revenue maximizing
Leviathan. This study has shed some light on the appropriate setting for the study
of government fiscal activity. These objective functions, as suggested above, lie at
the ends of possible government objectives. This study has not determined the true
objective function of government, but rather has shown that the outcomes of
government activity are not consistent with the pure equi-revenue provider. With a
purely equi-revenue government provider of goods and services the coefficient on
the tax base would be statistically insignificant.
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Chapter One described two views on government and the citizenry, The
classical view assumed government acts at the behest of its citizenry. The second
view describes the state and its government as presiding over its citizenry.
Depending on which of these views is adopted can determine possible explanations
for the relationship between the tax base and expenditures discovered in this study.
The first view might, for example, explain base broadness as facilitating
inefficiencies in the provision of government goods and services, while the second
view could explain this relationship as a result of the abuse of the taxing
authority’s power. It is not the purpose of this study to determine which of these
views is appropriate for government and the citizens of the state.
Thus, the empirical results do not confirm that the motive of government is
one of pure revenue maximization. This study does show when a government has
access to a broader base that government generates higher spending, all else equal.
This difference in spending could be thought of as surplus where the difference in
revenue generated and the demand for government goods and services is referred
to as a surplus, this surplus may arise for various reasons. Because this surplus
must be used, spending rises. There are several possible explanations why
governments may be observed accruing a surplus. Surplus may arise because of the
short-sightedness of political decision making, bureaucratic inefficiency, or the
lower cost of generating revenue by using an efficient tax.
Short-sightedness, a natural response to vote maximizing, is to distribute
short run benefits that out weigh short run cost at the expense of ignoring the long
run implications for such action. Short-sightedness may increase long term costs to
government and this difference is reflected as a current period surplus.
Bureaucratic inefficiencies can arise because public sector bureaus face an
incentive structure far less conducive to operating efficiency than do private sector
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firms, comparatively 7. In part these inefficiencies persist, as noted by Hoyt (1999),
because residents often do not bear the full cost of inefficient government activities
and they, therefore, have less of an incentive to curtail governments inefficiencies.
This is not meant to imply that government workers are indolent or
incapable, nor politicians greedy or dishonest, but rather the incentives they face
may lead to short-sightedness and operational inefficiencies. As Aristotle noted,
what is common to many is taken least care of, for all men have greater regard for
what is their own than for what they possess in common with others.
Finally, the efficiency of a tax potentially improved by base broadening
could lower the marginal cost of raising revenues thus enhancing revenue
generation. The efficiency gain assumes that the tax rate is lowered to finance any
given level of spending. The improvement in generating more revenue also
improves the probability a government can engage in generating a surplus. The
lower marginal cost of raising revenue would also increase the demand for
government services. This is analogous to a demand response for a normal good
from a price decrease. If the increase in demand for government goods and
services is just equal to the additional revenue raised, then no surplus would occur.
Otherwise, the efficiency obtained from an increase in the size of the tax base
would lead to a surplus.
Again, it is ones view of government, the state, and the citizenry that will
shape the arguments for why base broadness leads to higher government spending,
all else equal. As noted in Chapter One, states have recently been seeking their tax
bases to include e-commerce and services. While the arguments for the increase
speak of declining revenues from the sales tax, policy makers should also consider
that base broadening gains in efficiencies may also fuel increased spending.
7

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University, “Second Annual Performance Report Scorecard: Which Government Agencies Inform the
Public?”, May 16 ,2001 conclude federal government agencies had little ability to measure its effectiveness and could not link there performance
data to their cost.

82

In addition to examining the impact the tax base has on government
spending, tax base and tax rate relationships were examined. The tax base and rate
equations confirmed the fundamental hypothesis that the tax base and tax rate are
inversely related. Under the final specification the tax rate equation was sensitive
to the inclusion of fixed time effects. These effects were omitted because a
theoretical justification for their presence in the estimated model could not be
established.
The results fully support the theoretical relationship between the tax base
and rate. Thus, the empirical evidence finds base broadening will lead to lower
rates and conversely, rate increases reduce the base size.
The reduction in the tax base because of an increase in the tax rate, however,
could not be isolated into the two separate impacts from changes in consumer
demand and a political economy response to setting higher tax rates. A tax rate
increase will, for example encourage consumers, when possible, to substitute for
goods not in the tax base. This substitution effect, a response to the price increase
on goods in the base, would imply the political response may be quite small. The
tax rate response to a base broadening, however, is a political economy response
consistent with the public finance literature. The reduction in the tax rate from a
tax base increase can be considered a purely political economy response.
In order to investigate the possibility of a revenue neutral response through
base and rate changes, the final specification was run using only the actual dollar
amount of the base taxed by the state. Therefore, the coefficients are not measuring
the impact on the percent of the tax base that is taxed, but the actual size of the
base in CPI adjusted dollars.
Neither response by the tax base or rate is a revenue neutral response. To
examine the possibility of a neutral response, Table 6.1 lists the sample means for
the sales tax base, sales tax rate, and the revenue these means would generate
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(mean tax base times mean tax rate). Table 6.1 then shows how either a ten percent
increase in the sales tax rate or sales tax base is not sufficiently offset by a
reduction in the other variable, respectively, to maintain revenue neutrality. Using
the sample means of the tax base (measured as the dollars taxed), the tax rate, and
the parameter estimates from this modified specification to test for revenue
neutrality, result in concluding that a base or rate increase will not be revenue
neutral, all else equal.

Table 6.1: Revenue Changes from Tax or Base Increases ($000)

Tax Base ($000)

Tax Rate

Sales Tax Revenue ($000)

$29,595,670

0.045

$1,319,967

Tax Rate
Parameter

Predicted Base

Rate (10% increase)

New Revenue

-0.3357

$28,602,143

0.049

$1,403,221

Tax Base
Parameter

Base (10% increase)

Predicted Rate

New Revenue

-0.3007

$32,555,237

0.043

$1,408,303

Mean:

Tax Base Equation

Tax Rate Equation

As Chapter 3 showed, the broader tax base minimized the excess burden of
the tax through lower tax rates, but this broader base allows government to
generate greater surplus or maximize its revenues. This empirical study confirms
these implications postulated in Chapter 3. Thus, there is a trade-off to consider
when allowing government broad access to a tax base. The amount of the base
made available should be considered within the context of a traditional cost benefit
analysis where it can be stated; a broader tax base will lead to lower tax rates, but
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also increase government spending, all else equal. Thus, any efficiency gains may
be offset by fueling revenue growth.
Additionally, the empirical study included border effects in the base and rate
equations. These border effects were included to capture the yardstick competition
that states may engage in. It was found that bordering states influence a state’s
fiscal policy decisions. This type of yardstick competition occurs between states
with respect to setting tax rates, but not choosing the tax base. Thus, a state
surrounded by low tax rate states is more likely to set low rates as well.
Future Research and Limitations
This empirical study has established a relationship between government
spending and the size of a tax base, future research on this subject should branch
out in two directions. Theoretical models of local government will need to
incorporate both the costs and benefits from tax base broadening. Empirical
models will need to examine other tax bases and possibly develop a comprehensive
model encompassing a government’s total tax structure.
Here the sales tax was used to measure the impact on expenditures from base
broadness. Future work will need to determine if other taxes employed by
government, such as the income and property tax exhibit the same properties. Also,
it would be interesting to determine if the comprehensiveness of a governments
total tax structure similarly impacts spending. Empirical test could also examine if
these results hold for the federal government, other local governments and
international governments.
Additional future work would include the development of a theoretical
framework to contrast the trade off this study has shown is inherent in broadening
the tax base. Chapter 3 in this study only establishes the possibility that the tax
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base and government spending are related, but does not construct a framework for
modeling the costs and benefits from changes in the tax base.
There are several limitations to this study. First, the results of this empirical
test can not be used to definitively assign specific maximizing objective for state
governments. Multiple objectives, such as maximizing income or employment in
the state can coalesce with the bureaucratic or revenue maximizing objective
function. Nonetheless, this empirical examination on the role played by the tax
base reveals government to be something other than an equi-revenue provider of
goods and services. The main conclusion therefore is that a state’s access to a
broad base will allow the state to increase its expenditures, all else equal.
By measuring the tax base size as the tax base divided by the state’s private
gross state product to determine the base broadness, it is possible that this measure
under represents a state’s base broadness. Ring (1999) shows how the sales tax
may not be merely a flat tax on consumers, but for many states the sales tax falls
on intermediate goods purchased by businesses. Therefore, the tax base for those
states taxing intermediate goods may have a broader base than the base broadness
measure used in this study. However, the use of private gross state product, a value
added measure of a state’s business activity, rather than the state’s private personal
income, may lessen this impact on accurately portraying the sales tax base
comprehensiveness. Additional measures of the degree with which intermediate
goods enter the tax base should help enhance the researchers ability to portray the
broadness of the tax base.
Another limitation to the model is the use of other revenues to control for
other tax bases and rates utilized in the state. The purpose of including this variable
is to control for the sources of other revenue. This is in essence an aggregation of
data serving as a proxy for data on other tax variables. Because the proxy
corresponds reasonably well to movements in the theoretically correct variables
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and its omission runs the risk of biased coefficients, this limitation is not
econometrically problematic. There is only a loss of information on how these
other revenue bases and rates interact. A broader study encompassing a state’s total
tax structure would be able to include these variables into the equations.
Finally, the accounting literature has looked at the accounting choices of
firms with respect to how close they are to violating debt covenants. For example,
there may be two firms who both face debt covenants that put the debt into default
if they are violated, but one firm is near the violation thresholds and the other is
not. Research has found that these two firms tend to make different accounting
choices. This information could be included as a control variable in both the
estimation of TELs and tax bases.
In summary, this study has advanced both the public finance and public
choice literature by integrating the two strains and empirically examining the
relationship between the tax base and government spending. It has addressed the
question “ do broad base taxes lead to higher expenditures?”; and the answer is
yes.
The relationships developed in this study can be used in future research
examining different levels of government. Hopefully, this empirical essay on the
relationship between the tax base and government spending will lead to further
inquiries into the role tax bases play in determining government spending
outcomes.
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Appendix A: OLS Estimation Results
OLS Estimations: Per Capita Expenditures
Specification:

I

II

III

Coeff.

t-stat

p-stat

Coeff.

t-stat

p-stat

Coeff.

t-stat

p-stat

Sales Tax Base*

0.002

2.135

0.033

0.003

2.922

0.004

0.096

4.977

0.000

Per Capita Federal Transfers*

0.575

25.512

0.000

0.560

25.009

0.000

0.262

11.512

0.000

0.066

6.489

0.000

0.038

4.479

0.000

TEL*
Per Capita Private Income

-0.029

-0.367

0.714

-0.142

-1.815

0.070

-0.454

-6.124

0.000

Unemployment Rate

0.061

3.554

0.000

0.033

1.878

0.061

0.026

2.393

0.017

Per Capita Local Transfers

0.046

8.388

0.000

-0.062

-2.386

0.017

0.240

7.898

0.000

Per Capita Local Expenditures -0.079

-3.029

0.003

0.047

8.576

0.000

0.007

2.046

0.041

Per Capita Borrowing

4.091

0.000

0.006

3.865

0.000

0.002

3.743

0.000

Upper Distance

-0.004

-2.091

0.037

-0.002

-3.354

0.001

Lower Distance

0.000

-0.237

0.812

0.001
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0.404

Governor
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0.728
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0.006
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9.383

0.000
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0.000
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0.000

Percent under 18
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0.000
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Percent 65 and over
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Population Density
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0.000

4.428

7.783

0.000
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0.000

state indicators

output omitted

year indicators

output omitted

Adjusted or quasi R-squared 0.718
F-stat 144.820
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0.000

116.120

* Endogenous Variables
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OLS Estimations: Sales Tax Base
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Sales Tax Rate *
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Per Capita Expenditures*
Per Capita Private Income
Per Capita Other Revenue
Border Base
Change in Income (t-2)
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Percent under 18
Percent 65 and over
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state indicators
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Adjusted or quasi R-squared
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I
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II
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III
t-stat

p-stat
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-0.423
-0.112
0.013
0.138
7.971

299.037
2.328
-2.172
-3.001
-1.123
-8.259
2.239
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0.000
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0.032
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0.359
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0.001
0.474
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-0.001
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-1.038
-0.324
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4.539
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-2.006
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1.676
-0.030
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0.000
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0.000
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